CEN and CENELEC ratified EN 40000-1-2 on 2 November 2026; the definitive text has been available since 18 November 2026. The CEN project entry expressly notes that no citation in the Official Journal of the European Union is expected. The standard therefore does not, on its own, give rise to a presumption of conformity with the Cyber Resilience Act.
EN 40000-1-2:2026 – Principles, risk management and lifecycle
Since 18 November 2026, EN 40000-1-2 has been available – together with the vocabulary part EN 40000-1-1, one of the first two European standards supporting the Cyber Resilience Act. It sets out cybersecurity principles, baseline requirements for managing cybersecurity risks and activities across the entire product lifecycle. Citation in the Official Journal is not expected; it therefore confers no presumption of conformity. This page puts the standard into context, guides you through risk management and the lifecycle, and offers a readiness check.
Last updated: November 2026 · Valeri Milke, ISO 27001 & ISO 42001 Lead Auditor
Available since 18 Nov 2026 · not in the Official Journal
- 01Planning
- 02Requirements
- 03Design
- 04Development
- 05Verification
- 06Production
- 07Monitoring
- 08Decommissioning
01 Planning · plan and track activities across the whole lifecycle02 Requirements · derive from product context and risk assessment03 Design · define architecture and protective measures04 Development · secure environment, component list, documentation05 Verification · analyze, scan, test – recurring06 Production · protect integrity and authenticity through to delivery07 Monitoring · observe sources, handle issues without delay08 Decommissioning · securely reset, remove data and keys
4Principles6Building blocks of risk managementM/606Standardisation request
18 Nov 2026Definitive text available (DAV) – ratified on 2 November 2026
4Principles: risk-based approach, security by design, secure by default, transparency
450+Experts from 28 national standardisation bodies and 17 partner organisations in the responsible working group
0Citations in the Official Journal: none is expected for Part 1-2 – so no presumption of conformity arises
The Cyber Resilience Act requires manufacturers to design, develop and produce products with digital elements on the basis of an assessment of cybersecurity risks – and to keep that assessment up to date throughout the support period. EN 40000-1-2:2026 describes what this looks like methodically; it was developed by the joint working group CEN-CLC/JTC 13/WG 9 under the Commission’s Standardisation request M/606. The standard is product-related, applies to all product categories and forms the framework on which the product-specific standards are meant to build. What matters for putting it in context: citation in the Official Journal of the European Union is not expected for this part. Those who apply the standard gain a methodology agreed at European level and a robust structure for the technical documentation – it does not replace demonstrating that the essential requirements of the Regulation are met.
From the standardisation request to the first CRA standards – and what is still to come
The milestones of EN 40000-1-2 alongside the deadlines of the Cyber Resilience Act. The national dates come from the standard’s CEN project entry.
10 December 2024
CRA enters into force
The Cyber Resilience Act enters into force. Its obligations apply in stages; harmonised standards are meant to make it easier for manufacturers to demonstrate the essential requirements.
3 February 2025
Standardisation request M/606
The Commission mandates CEN, CENELEC and ETSI to develop 41 horizontal and product-specific standards in support of the CRA.
March 2026
German draft standard
The draft is published as E DIN EN 40000-1-2 in German and English versions – at the time still under the title “Principles for cyber resilience”.
11 June 2026
Rules for conformity assessment bodies
The provisions on the notification of conformity assessment bodies apply – a prerequisite for notified bodies under the CRA.
11 September 2026
Reporting obligations apply
Manufacturers report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents via ENISA’s single reporting platform – also for products placed on the market before that date.
2 November 2026
Ratification
CEN and CENELEC ratify EN 40000-1-2; the terminology part EN 40000-1-1 is published together with it.
10 November 2026
Deadlines of the standardisation request adjusted
The Commission amends the standardisation request by implementing decision and slightly postpones the deadlines planned for 2026 – to 30 November 2026 for the horizontal standards on risk-based design and vulnerability handling, and to 31 January 2027 for the vertical standards. The remaining horizontal standards stay at 30 October 2027.
18 November 2026
Text available
The definitive text of EN 40000-1-2:2026 is available to the national standardisation bodies (Date of Availability). On the following day, CEN and CENELEC announce the publication of the first two CRA standards.
28 February 2027
National announcement
Latest date by which the national standardisation bodies must announce the standard’s availability (Date of Announcement).
31 May 2027
National versions
Latest date for adoption as a national standard, in Germany as DIN EN 40000-1-2; conflicting national standards must be withdrawn by then.
11 December 2027
Full application of the CRA
All obligations of the Regulation apply – including the essential requirements for products and conformity assessment before placing on the market.
Nine points manufacturers should know about EN 40000-1-2
Click a card to expand the point – or open them all at once.
Part 1-2 is the horizontal foundation standard: it applies to all products with digital elements, regardless of category and sector. Its baseline requirements for risk management form the framework on which coherent product-specific standards are meant to build. It deliberately contains no concrete requirements for individual product categories.
The standard opens with four general cybersecurity principles: a risk-based approach, security by design, secure by default and transparency toward users. Risk management and lifecycle activities are aligned with them.
The core of the standard is a product-related risk management process: establish the product context, define risk acceptance criteria, assess and treat risks, communicate residual risks to users, and review the assessment regularly and on specific occasions. The CRA requires such a documented risk assessment in the technical documentation.
From planning through requirements, design, development, verification and validation to production, delivery, monitoring and decommissioning, the standard describes activities that establish and maintain an appropriate level of cybersecurity. In our reading, it does not presuppose a particular process model – the activities fit phase models just as well as agile and DevSecOps workflows.
Every activity follows the same structure: which inputs it needs, what is required, what output results and by which criteria fulfilment can be assessed. This makes the standard auditable – and provides a ready-made structure for evidence and technical documentation.
Components from third parties, including free and open-source software, are part of the lifecycle: due diligence comes before integration, followed by ongoing monitoring. This matches the CRA’s due diligence obligation for third-party components and the obligation to record components in a software bill of materials (SBOM).
Without standards cited in the Official Journal, manufacturers demonstrate fulfilment of the essential requirements directly and describe the chosen solutions in the technical documentation. For important products of Class I, this means: self-assessment is open only with fully applied harmonised standards, common specifications or a suitable European cybersecurity certification (exception: free and open-source software with public technical documentation) – EN 40000-1-2 alone does not open this route.
The CRA’s reporting obligations have applied since 11 September 2026, the other manufacturer obligations apply from 11 December 2027. Those who align their risk assessment and development process with EN 40000-1-2 now create a structure to which the following parts connect: vulnerability handling, general security requirements and product-specific standards.
Interactive
Classification: What does EN 40000-1-2 mean for your product?
Up to four yes/no questions clarify whether the CRA covers your product, what role Part 1-2 plays for your demonstration of conformity and which additional standards you should follow. Orientation, not legal advice.
Your path
- 1?
1: Do you manufacture a product with digital elements – or offer one under your own name or trademark on the EU market?
1
Do you manufacture a product with digital elements – or offer one under your own name or trademark on the EU market?
This means products with digital elements: devices with firmware, standalone software, apps and separately offered components that can be connected directly or indirectly to a device or network. Pure online services are not a product in themselves.
EN 40000-1-2 is your methodological framework for the CRA risk assessment
For products of the default category, internal control by the manufacturer is sufficient. You demonstrate the essential requirements yourself – EN 40000-1-2 gives your risk assessment and development process a recognized structure, even without a presumption of conformity.
- Set up risk management according to the standard’s six building blocks: product context, acceptance criteria, assessment, treatment, communication, review.
- Anchor the lifecycle activities in the existing development process – with inputs, outputs and assessment criteria for each activity.
- Structure the technical documentation along the standard and describe the chosen solution for each essential requirement.
- Follow Part 1-3 on vulnerability handling: it is the next part of the series and is intended to fulfil the standardisation request on vulnerability handling; no decision has yet been taken on citation in the Official Journal.
Internal control (module A)EN 40000-1-2 · Risk managementFprEN 40000-1-3
Map your existing process to EN 40000-1-2
Those who already work according to IEC 62443-4-1, ISO/SAE 21434 or with ISMS-supported risk management do not have to start over. The product focus is decisive: risks per product, along the entire lifecycle and with communication of residual risks to users.
- Create a mapping: assign the activities and artifacts of your process to the standard’s building blocks and lifecycle activities.
- Check for typical gaps: risk acceptance criteria, communication of residual risks, decommissioning and ongoing monitoring of third-party components.
- Bundle evidence per product, not only per organization – the technical documentation requires the risk assessment of the specific product.
IEC 62443-4-1ISO/SAE 21434ISO/IEC 27005
Class I: EN 40000-1-2 does not open self-assessment
Important products of Class I may be assessed by internal control if harmonised standards, common specifications or a European cybersecurity certification scheme of at least assurance level “substantial” are fully applied. Since Part 1-2 is not cited in the Official Journal, until then the only route is via a notified body: EU-type examination followed by conformity to EU-type based on internal production control, or full quality assurance. Exception: manufacturers of free and open-source software may use internal control if they make the technical documentation publicly available when placing the product on the market.
- Plan for a notified body early – the rules on conformity assessment bodies have applied since 11 June 2026.
- Align your risk assessment and development process with EN 40000-1-2 anyway: the notified body assesses against the essential requirements, and a methodology agreed at European level makes the assessment easier.
- Follow product-specific standards for your category, for example from the ETSI EN 304 series: only cited vertical standards can open self-assessment.
- Document the core functionality unambiguously – it determines the classification.
Module B+C or HETSI EN 304EN 40000-1-2 as methodology
Class II and critical products: third-party assessment is required anyway
For important products of Class II, the CRA requires a notified body – EU-type examination or full quality assurance – or, where available, a European cybersecurity certification scheme of at least assurance level “substantial”. The only exception is free and open-source software with publicly available technical documentation. For critical products, the Commission may require certification. EN 40000-1-2 changes nothing about this, but provides the methodology with which you prepare the assessment.
- Define the assessment strategy: type examination, full quality assurance or certification – depending on product and variant diversity.
- Build the risk assessment according to EN 40000-1-2 as the centerpiece of the technical documentation.
- Keep an eye on product-specific standards and European certification schemes such as EUCC.
Module B+C or HEUCCCritical products
Your product is excluded from the CRA
Medical devices, type-approved vehicles, certified aviation products and marine equipment are subject to their own rules; identical spare parts and products for national security and defense are excluded altogether. Neither the CRA nor EN 40000-1-2 is decisive for you – but the standard is a useful benchmark for risk management and the lifecycle.
- Medical devices: MDR and IVDR with the guidance MDCG 2019-16 and the standard IEC 81001-5-1 as reference points.
- Vehicles: UN R155 and R156 with ISO/SAE 21434 as the engineering standard.
- Examine accessories, apps and retrofit products outside the exclusion separately – they may fall under the CRA.
CRA · ExclusionsMDR/IVDRUN R155
Without a product with digital elements of your own, EN 40000-1-2 does not apply
The standard is addressed to manufacturers of products with digital elements. Pure online services, consulting services or products without a data connection are not in themselves covered by the CRA. Importers and distributors have their own CRA obligations and become manufacturers themselves if they offer a product under their own name or modify it substantially. The methodology can still serve as good practice.
- Document the delimitation: justify why your offering is not a product with digital elements – also with regard to reasonably foreseeable use.
- Check online services: a service forms part of a product’s remote data processing only if the product manufacturer designed and developed its software itself or under its responsibility – for example as commissioned development – and the product could not perform one of its functions without it. A generally offered service does not thereby become part of other manufacturers’ products.
- Other frameworks apply to services, such as NIS2 – the risk logic of EN 40000-1-2 can still be transferred.
CRA · ScopeCRA guidance · Remote data processing
- Do you manufacture a product with digital elements – or offer one under your own name or trademark on the EU market?
- Is your product expressly excluded from the CRA – for example as a medical device, a type-approved vehicle or a product certified under EU aviation law?
- Does your product’s core functionality correspond to a category of important (Class I or II) or critical products?
- Does the core functionality belong to Class II or to the critical products?
- Do you already run a documented secure development process with risk management – for example according to IEC 62443-4-1, ISO/SAE 21434 or based on your ISMS?
Lifecycle navigator
Eight lifecycle activities, one risk management at the core
EN 40000-1-2 links risk management with activities from planning to decommissioning; the handling of third-party components accompanies the whole cycle. For each entry: typical misconceptions, references, measures, a review question and evidence – prepared by VamiSec, not a reproduction of the standard’s text.
Lifecycle
Cross-cutting
Lifecycle · start of every product and every version
Planning cybersecurity across the lifecycle
The standard requires cybersecurity activities to be planned for the whole lifecycle, the plan to be kept up to date and its implementation to be tracked. The plan connects risk management, development, production and operation through to the end of the support period.
ContextEN 40000-1-2 · Lifecycle activity Planning · CRA · Risk assessment in all phases
Typical misconceptions
- “A security concept at the start of the project is enough.” – The plan covers the whole lifecycle and is updated continuously, including after placing on the market. (high)
- “Planning is a matter for the security department.” – Without product management, development, production and support, gaps arise at the handovers. (medium)
- “The support period is a sales topic.” – It determines how long monitoring, updates and risk review must continue. (medium)
References
EN 40000-1-2 · Lifecycle activitiesCRA · Risk assessment in planning, design, development, production, delivery and maintenanceCRA · Support period
What to do
- Create a cybersecurity plan per product or product family: activities, responsible persons, dates, inputs and expected outputs.
- Define and justify the support period early – it determines the effort for monitoring and updates.
- Interlock the plan with the development process: sprint, release or phase gates with cybersecurity criteria.
- Track progress measurably and feed deviations into the risk review.
Review question for product ownership
Is there a maintained plan for each product that shows which cybersecurity activities are due until the end of the support period – and who is responsible for them?
Evidence you can present
- Cybersecurity plan with activities, roles and dates
- Defined and justified support period
- Gate records with cybersecurity criteria
Lifecycle · from product context and risk assessment
Deriving requirements from risk
Requirements arise from the product context and the results of the risk assessment – not from a generic checklist. They are documented and reviewed when the context or the risks change.
ContextEN 40000-1-2 · Lifecycle activity Requirements · CRA · Essential requirements
Typical misconceptions
- “We simply adopt all the essential requirements word for word.” – The CRA requires a risk-based application; requirements that do not apply must be justified. (high)
- “Requirements are written once.” – New threats or functions change them. (medium)
- “Security requirements go to the end of the backlog.” – They need acceptance criteria like any feature. (medium)
References
EN 40000-1-2 · RequirementsCRA · Essential cybersecurity requirementsCRA · Justification of requirements that do not apply
What to do
- Derive requirements per product from threats and acceptance criteria and link them traceably: risk, requirement, test.
- For each essential requirement, record whether and how it applies – and justify non-applicability.
- Formulate acceptance criteria that can be checked in verification and validation.
- Review the requirements with every risk review.
Review question for product ownership
Can you show, for each security requirement, which risk it comes from and how its fulfilment is tested?
Evidence you can present
- Requirements catalog with traceability to risks and tests
- Applicability matrix of the essential requirements with justifications
- Change history of the requirements
Lifecycle · Security by design
Architecture and protective measures
In design, manufacturers define the architecture and protective measures – so that they also hold up in interaction with their own and third-party components. This is where the principles of security by design and secure by default become concrete: small attack surface, least privilege, defense in depth, secure default settings.
ContextEN 40000-1-2 · Lifecycle activity Design · Principles security by design and secure by default
Typical misconceptions
- “We’ll do threat modeling after the pentest.” – Architecture decisions are then expensive to change. (high)
- “Secure by default means security features are present.” – They must be active in the delivery state, not only after configuration. (high)
- “Interfaces to third-party components are their problem.” – The architecture must cover integration risks. (medium)
References
EN 40000-1-2 · DesignEN 40000-1-2 · PrinciplesCRA · Secure by default configuration and limitation of attack surfaces
What to do
- Create and maintain a threat model per product based on the product context, for example with STRIDE or attack trees.
- Document architecture decisions with a security rationale: trust boundaries, interfaces, data flows.
- Define the delivery state: unneeded services off, secure default values, simple reset.
- Carry out security-focused design reviews before implementation.
Review question for product ownership
Is it documented for each product which threats the design addresses and what the secure delivery state looks like?
Evidence you can present
- Threat model and architecture documentation with trust boundaries
- Design review records
- Specification of the secure delivery state
Lifecycle · Implementation
Secure development and documentation
Development takes place in a secured environment. The activity includes a maintained component list or software bill of materials (SBOM) and the preparation of technical documentation and information for users.
ContextEN 40000-1-2 · Lifecycle activity Development · CRA · SBOM and technical documentation
Typical misconceptions
- “We’ll generate the SBOM shortly before release.” – It is produced continuously from the build and is the basis of vulnerability handling. (high)
- “Our CI/CD pipeline is not part of the product.” – A compromised build environment compromises every artifact. (high)
- “We’ll write the documentation at the end.” – Technical documentation and user information grow with the product. (medium)
References
EN 40000-1-2 · DevelopmentCRA · Software bill of materials (SBOM)CRA · Technical documentation and information for users
What to do
- Harden the development and build environment: access control, signed commits and artifacts, secured pipeline.
- Anchor secure coding guidelines and automated checks such as SAST, secret scanning and dependency checks in the workflow.
- Generate the SBOM automatically per build in a common machine-readable format, for example CycloneDX or SPDX.
- Maintain technical documentation and user information under version control.
Review question for product ownership
Is an SBOM traceably generated for every delivered artifact – and is the build environment itself protected against tampering?
Evidence you can present
- Secure coding policy and pipeline configuration with security checks
- SBOM per release (CycloneDX or SPDX)
- Versioned technical documentation and user information
Lifecycle · Analysis, scans, tests
Verification and validation
Whether requirements and protective measures work is shown by analyses, scans and tests – recurring, not one-off. Verification checks against the requirements, validation against the intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable use.
ContextEN 40000-1-2 · Lifecycle activity Verification and validation · CRA · Regular tests
Typical misconceptions
- “A pentest before launch is enough.” – Every relevant change needs suitable tests, across the whole support period. (high)
- “Scanner results are the verification.” – Without a link to requirements and risks, it remains open whether the right things were checked. (medium)
- “No known vulnerabilities – so we’re done.” – The CRA requires products to be made available without known exploitable vulnerabilities; this must be evidenced. (medium)
References
EN 40000-1-2 · Verification and validationCRA · Making available without known exploitable vulnerabilitiesCRA · Effective and regular security tests
What to do
- Derive the test strategy from requirements and risks: static and dynamic analysis, fuzzing and penetration tests depending on risk.
- Repeat tests with every release and with relevant changes – automated where possible.
- Trace results back to requirements and risks; transfer open findings into risk treatment.
- Before making available, evidence that no known exploitable vulnerability is open.
Review question for product ownership
Can you show for the current release which tests cover which requirements – and that no known exploitable vulnerability is open?
Evidence you can present
- Test strategy and test reports with traceability
- Pentest and scan reports with treatment status
- Release record with vulnerability status
Lifecycle · Integrity up to placing on the market
Production and delivery
Between release and customer, nothing may be changed unnoticed: the integrity and authenticity of software and physical products must be protected throughout production and distribution. This includes secure provisioning of key material and tamper-protected delivery routes.
ContextEN 40000-1-2 · Lifecycle activity Production and delivery · CRA · Integrity and secure update distribution
Typical misconceptions
- “What leaves the build server is trustworthy.” – Without a signature and verification at the recipient, tampering goes undetected. (high)
- “Manufacturing at the contract manufacturer is their business.” – Key injection and firmware flashing belong in your risk assessment. (high)
- “Updates are not delivery.” – Update channels need the same integrity protection. (medium)
References
EN 40000-1-2 · Production and deliveryCRA · Protecting the integrity of data, programs and configurationCRA · Secure distribution of updates
What to do
- Sign firmware and software and verify signatures in the device or at installation, for example via secure boot and signed packages.
- Secure the provisioning of keys and certificates in manufacturing – including at contract manufacturers.
- Document the supply chain up to placing on the market and control handover points.
- Operate update channels with the same integrity and authenticity protection.
Review question for product ownership
Can a customer verify that the device, firmware or software corresponds exactly to the released state?
Evidence you can present
- Signing and key management concept
- Manufacturing and provisioning instructions, including contract manufacturers
- Evidence of the securing of the update infrastructure
Lifecycle · After placing on the market
Monitoring and issue management
After placing on the market, manufacturers observe internal and external sources – vulnerability databases, reports from researchers, customer reports, suppliers – and handle issues without undue delay. This is where vulnerability handling under Part 1-3 connects.
ContextEN 40000-1-2 · Lifecycle activity Monitoring and issue management · FprEN 40000-1-3
Typical misconceptions
- “Monitoring means subscribing to a CVE feed.” – Without SBOM matching, triage and ownership, the feed has no consequences. (high)
- “Reporting obligations only come in 2027.” – Actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents have been reportable since 11 September 2026. (high)
- “Issue management and vulnerability handling are the same thing.” – Not every issue is a vulnerability, but each can change a risk. (low)
References
EN 40000-1-2 · Monitoring and issue managementFprEN 40000-1-3 · Vulnerability handlingCRA · Reporting obligations since 11 September 2026
What to do
- Define and monitor sources: CVE and the European Vulnerability Database (EUVD), vendor and community advisories, researchers, customers, suppliers.
- Match the SBOM automatically against new vulnerabilities; triage with deadlines and responsibilities.
- Operate a reporting process for actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents: early warning within 24 hours, notification within 72 hours, final report.
- Feed findings back into the risk review.
Review question for product ownership
How quickly do you learn that a newly published vulnerability affects one of your delivered products – and who then decides?
Evidence you can present
- Monitoring concept with sources and responsibilities
- Triage and treatment records with deadlines
- Reporting process and exercise records for the CRA reporting obligation
Lifecycle · End of the support period
Decommissioning and end of support
The standard thinks the product through to its end: manufacturers prepare for secure resetting or retirement – including the possibility for users to permanently remove data and security material such as keys and credentials.
ContextEN 40000-1-2 · Lifecycle activity Decommissioning · CRA · Permanent removal of data and settings
Typical misconceptions
- “What happens after the end of support is the customer’s business.” – Users must know when support ends and how to retire the product securely. (high)
- “A factory reset deletes everything.” – Without a verified procedure, keys, tokens or personal data remain. (medium)
- “Decommissioning only concerns hardware.” – User accounts, backend services and certificates also need an orderly end. (low)
References
EN 40000-1-2 · DecommissioningCRA · Secure and permanent removal of all data and settingsCRA · Indication of the end of the support period
What to do
- Specify and test procedures for secure resetting and deletion – including keys, certificates and credentials.
- Communicate the end of support early and prominently; provide guidance on secure retirement.
- Plan backend dependencies of remote data processing for the end of support.
- Align the validity periods of certificates and keys with the support period.
Review question for product ownership
Can users reset your product at the end so that no data, keys or credentials remain – and do they know when support ends?
Evidence you can present
- Tested deletion and reset procedure
- User information on the end of the support period
- Retirement concept for backend services
Cross-cutting · Core of EN 40000-1-2
Risk management at the core
Six building blocks form the cycle: product context (intended purpose, reasonably foreseeable use, operating environment, architecture, users), risk acceptance criteria, risk assessment (assets, threats, likelihood and impact), risk treatment, communication of residual risks and review – regularly and on occasions such as product changes or new vulnerabilities.
ContextEN 40000-1-2 · Risk management · CRA · Assessment of cybersecurity risks
Typical misconceptions
- “Our ISMS risk register covers that.” – EN 40000-1-2 assesses risks per product and for its users, not only for one’s own organization. (high)
- “We keep residual risks internal.” – Remaining risks and conditions for secure use must be communicated to users in an understandable way. (high)
- “Each project sets its own acceptance criteria.” – Without uniform criteria, assessments are not comparable between products. (medium)
References
EN 40000-1-2 · Risk managementCRA · Assessment of cybersecurity risks, documented and updatedCRA · Information and instructions for users
What to do
- Document the product context per product: purpose, foreseeable use, operating environment, architecture overview, user groups – including remote data processing.
- Define company-wide risk acceptance criteria that take regulatory requirements and the state of the art into account.
- Assess impacts on users and third parties – not only on your own company.
- Define occasions for review: product change, new threat landscape, newly known or actively exploited vulnerability.
Review question for product ownership
Is there a current, documented risk assessment with fixed acceptance criteria for each product – and do your users know which residual risks remain?
Evidence you can present
- Risk assessment per product with product context and acceptance criteria
- Risk treatment plan with residual risk assessment
- User information on residual risks and secure use
- Records of the regular and event-driven review
Cross-cutting · Across the entire lifecycle
Third-party components and open source
Third-party components – commercial or open source – belong in every lifecycle step: due diligence before integration, verification and ongoing monitoring afterwards. The CRA requires manufacturers to exercise due diligence when integrating them so that integrated components do not compromise the cybersecurity of the product.
ContextEN 40000-1-2 · Third-party components · CRA · Due diligence for third-party components
Typical misconceptions
- “Open source is free, so without obligations.” – For the manufacturer, every integrated component counts, including a non-monetized one. (high)
- “A one-off license and vulnerability check is enough.” – Components continue to be monitored throughout the entire lifecycle. (high)
- “We keep vulnerabilities in components to ourselves.” – The CRA obliges you to report them to those responsible for the component. (medium)
References
EN 40000-1-2 · Third-party componentsCRA · Due diligence for third-party componentsCRA · Reporting vulnerabilities to component maintainers
What to do
- Define selection criteria for components: maintenance status, security history, origin, license, support commitments.
- Record components in the SBOM and match them continuously against new vulnerabilities.
- Supplement supplier agreements with security commitments, reporting channels and support periods.
- Report vulnerabilities found to maintainers or suppliers and contribute fixes back.
Review question for product ownership
Do you know for each third-party component who maintains it, how long it is supported and how you learn of its vulnerabilities?
Evidence you can present
- Criteria and records of the component review
- SBOM with ongoing vulnerability matching
- Supplier contracts with security clauses
- Reports to component maintainers
Planning cybersecurity across the lifecycle
Standards map
EN 40000-1-2 in the standards framework of the Cyber Resilience Act
Where Part 1-2 stands, what comes before and after it and which standards you can already use today. Filter by level and contribution; information as of 22 November 2026.
2CRA standards published: EN 40000-1-1 and EN 40000-1-2
0CRA standards cited in the Official Journal so far
41standards planned under Standardisation request M/606
11 Dec 2027full application of the Cyber Resilience Act
Level
Contribution
12 of 12 entries
StandardSubjectSignificance for manufacturersStatus
EN 40000-1-1:2026EN 40000-1 (horizontal)TerminologyPart 1-1 · VocabularyCommon terms and definitions for the entire EN 40000 series, without technical requirements of its own. Those who set up risk assessment and documentation according to Part 1-2 use this terminology.Published in November 2026 · not in the Official JournalTerminology
EN 40000-1-2:2026EN 40000-1 (horizontal)Principles, product risk management and lifecycle activitiesPart 1-2 · this pageHorizontal foundation standard for all products with digital elements: four principles, baseline requirements for risk management and activities from planning to decommissioning. Framework for the product-specific standards.Published · available since 18 November 2026 · no citation expectedRisk managementLifecycle
FprEN 40000-1-3EN 40000-1 (horizontal)Vulnerability handlingPart 1-3 · Vulnerability HandlingIs intended to specify the obligations after placing on the market: detecting, documenting and fixing vulnerabilities, coordinated disclosure, secure distribution of updates. Draws on ISO/IEC 29147 and ISO/IEC 30111.Formal vote · no decision yet on citation in the Official JournalVulnerabilities
prEN 40000-1-4EN 40000-1 (horizontal)Generic security requirementsPart 1-4 · Generic Security RequirementsIntended to specify the technical requirement areas of the essential requirements, such as access control, confidentiality, integrity and availability. Until then, manufacturers derive measures themselves from their risk assessment.In preparation · delivery deadline under the standardisation request October 2027Technical requirements
ETSI EN 304 …Product-specificProduct-specific standards for important and critical productsETSI · vertical standardsVertical standards for individual product categories, such as browsers, password managers, VPN products or operating systems. They are meant to build on the horizontal framework and – once cited in the Official Journal – can give rise to a presumption of conformity for their category.Drafts in the voting stageProduct categoryTechnical requirements
EN IEC 62443-4-1 · -4-2InternationalSecure development process and technical requirements for componentsIEC 62443 · Industry and OTRecognized state of the art for industrial components. The process requirements of Part 4-1 overlap strongly with the lifecycle activities of EN 40000-1-2; an adaptation to the CRA is in progress.Published · CRA adaptation in progressLifecycleTechnical requirements
ISO/IEC 29147 · ISO/IEC 30111InternationalVulnerability disclosure and processes for vulnerability handlingISO/IEC · internationalInternational basis for coordinated disclosure and internal handling of vulnerabilities – the bridge from the monitoring activity in Part 1-2 to vulnerability handling in Part 1-3.Published · internationalVulnerabilities
ISO/IEC 27005 · ISO 31000InternationalInformation security risk management and general risk managementISO/IEC · internationalWell-known methodology from the ISMS environment. The logic of context, assessment and treatment is compatible; however, EN 40000-1-2 requires the product focus and the communication of residual risks to users.Published · internationalRisk management
ETSI EN 303 645Other frameworksCybersecurity of connected consumer devicesETSI · Consumer IoTWidely used baseline requirements for connected consumer devices, such as no universal default passwords, update capability and a point for reporting vulnerabilities. A good template for technical measures, but not a CRA standard.Published · not cited for the CRATechnical requirements
EN 18031-1 · -2 · -3Other frameworksCybersecurity of radio equipmentRadio Equipment Directive · delegated regulationHarmonised standards for connected radio equipment, whose cybersecurity requirements have applied since 1 August 2025. For many radio products a predecessor in substance – not a substitute for the evidence under the CRA.Cited in the Official Journal, with restrictions · for the Radio Equipment DirectiveTechnical requirements
ISO/SAE 21434 · IEC 81001-5-1Other frameworksEngineering standards for vehicles and health softwareSector legislation · outside the CRAAuthoritative for type-approved vehicles (UN R155) and medical devices (MDR/IVDR), which are excluded from the CRA. Methodologically closely related – manufacturers with products in both worlds can set up their processes jointly.Published · sector legislationRisk managementLifecycle
C/2026/6013Other frameworksCommission guidance on the application of the CRACommission · not bindingInterpretation of scope, substantial modification, support period, open source and remote data processing – the guardrails within which you apply the methodology of Part 1-2.Official Journal C of 17 November 2026Risk management
Status information based on the CEN project entry for EN 40000-1-2, the announcement by CEN and CENELEC of 19 November 2026 and public project information; citations change only with publication in the Official Journal. Compilation and assessment: VamiSec, not legal advice.
Deep dive
EN 40000-1-2 in detail
Ten chapters from classification through principles, risk management and lifecycle to the implementation roadmap – for product owners, development leads and compliance.
What EN 40000-1-2 is – and what it is not
The first horizontal standard with requirements supporting the Cyber Resilience Act gives manufacturers a common methodology for cybersecurity risks across the entire product lifecycle. It is not proof of conformity.
EN 40000-1-2:2026 is titled “Cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements – Part 1-2: Principles, product risk management, and lifecycle activities”. The standard sets out general cybersecurity principles, baseline requirements for the management of cybersecurity risks and activities with which these risks can be reduced. Its aim: to establish and maintain an appropriate, risk-based level of cybersecurity across the entire lifecycle – from design to the end of support and decommissioning.
2 Nov 2026Ratification by CEN and CENELEC
18 Nov 2026Definitive text available
31 May 2027Latest date for the national versions
35.030ICS classification IT security
Who developed it
The joint working group CEN-CLC/JTC 13/WG 9 is responsible; it develops horizontal cybersecurity standards for products with digital elements, and the secretariat is held by the Dutch standardisation institute NEN. According to CEN and CENELEC, more than 450 experts from 28 national standardisation bodies and 17 partner organisations contributed; the work received financial support from the EU executive agency EISMEA under the STAN4CR grant. The basis is Standardisation request M/606, with which the Commission mandated CEN, CENELEC and ETSI to develop standards in support of the CRA.
What the standard delivers
- Common language: together with the terminology part EN 40000-1-1, a uniform vocabulary for manufacturers, assessment bodies and authorities.
- Methodology: a product-related risk management process with fixed building blocks.
- Lifecycle: activities that anchor cybersecurity from planning to decommissioning.
- Framework: baseline requirements on which coherent product-specific standards are meant to build.
What it does not deliver
EN 40000-1-2 contains no concrete technical requirements for individual product categories – it expressly leaves those to the vertical standards. And according to the CEN project entry, no citation in the Official Journal of the European Union is expected. It therefore lacks the effect that harmonised standards have in European product law: the presumption that a product complying with the standard meets the legal requirements.
Status: published, but without a presumption of conformity
In European product law, it is not the publication of a standard that determines its legal effect, but its citation in the Official Journal. For Part 1-2, none is expected.
The Cyber Resilience Act follows the New Legislative Framework: the Regulation sets essential requirements, and harmonised standards describe how they can be met. Only when the Commission publishes the reference of a standard in the Official Journal does the presumption of conformity with the covered requirements apply to products that comply with it.
| Characteristic | Status for EN 40000-1-2 |
|---|---|
| Status at CEN | Published |
| Ratification (DOR) | 2 November 2026 |
| Availability (DAV) | 18 November 2026 |
| National announcement by (DOA) | 28 February 2027 |
| National publication by (DOP) | 31 May 2027 |
| Withdrawal of conflicting national standards (DOW) | 31 May 2027 |
| Legal reference | Cyber Resilience Act, Standardisation request M/606 |
| Citation in the Official Journal | Not expected |
| Presumption of conformity | None |
Source: CEN project entry JT013089, retrieved on 22 November 2026.
What this means in practice
- Default category: internal control by the manufacturer is possible anyway. EN 40000-1-2 structures your evidence but does not replace it.
- Important products of Class I: self-assessment is open only with fully applied harmonised standards, common specifications or a suitable European certification scheme – or for free and open-source software with public technical documentation. Part 1-2 does not meet this condition; until suitable cited standards or common specifications exist, the route is via a notified body.
- Class II and critical products: third-party assessment or certification is required – for Class II, the only exception is free and open-source software with public technical documentation; the standard provides the methodology for preparation.
- Technical documentation: manufacturers list the cited harmonised standards, common specifications or certification schemes applied; where none were applied, they describe the chosen solutions together with a list of other relevant technical specifications applied. EN 40000-1-2 can be named there – the link to the individual essential requirements remains your justification.
The standards framework: horizontal, vertical and what follows
EN 40000-1-2 is the starting point of a standards family. Those who understand its logic can place the following parts in context before they appear.
Standardisation request M/606 of 3 February 2025 foresees 41 standards: horizontal standards that apply to all products and vertical standards for specific categories of important and critical products. CEN and CENELEC are developing the horizontal parts EN 40000-1-x and some of the product-specific standards – some of them also with an EN 40000 number, such as EN 40000-10 for identity and access management –, ETSI vertical standards of the EN 304 series. In November 2026, the Commission slightly postponed the delivery deadlines planned for 2026: to 30 November 2026 for the horizontal standards on risk-based design, development and production and on vulnerability handling, and to 31 January 2027 for the vertical standards.
| Part | Subject | Role in the framework | Status 22 November 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EN 40000-1-1 | Terminology | Common vocabulary of the series | published, not cited in the Official Journal |
| EN 40000-1-2 | Principles, risk management, lifecycle | Methodological framework for all products and for the vertical standards | published, no citation expected |
| FprEN 40000-1-3 | Vulnerability handling | Requirements after placing on the market | formal vote |
| prEN 40000-1-4 | Generic security requirements | Technical requirement areas of the essential requirements | in preparation |
| Vertical standards | Categories of important and critical products | Concrete requirements per category | drafts in the voting stage |
Status according to CEN and CENELEC and public project information.
Why the framework matters
The product-specific standards are meant to build on the baseline requirements of Part 1-2. For manufacturers, this means: those who structure their risk management process according to Part 1-2 today do not have to rebuild it when the standard for their own product category appears – they supplement it with its concrete requirements.
The four principles: risk-based, secure by design, secure by default, transparent
The principles describe the stance from which risk management and lifecycle activities are carried out. They coincide with the guiding ideas of the CRA’s essential requirements.
Risk-based approach
The appropriate level of cybersecurity results from the risks of the specific product in its context – not from a blanket checklist. Measures are selected with justification, residual risks deliberately accepted.
Security by design
Security is designed in from the start: small attack surface, least privilege, defense in depth and secure coding. Later corrections are more expensive and rarely complete.
Secure by default
The delivery state is secure: unneeded services are disabled, secure default values are set, and resetting to the original state is easily possible.
Transparency
Users learn what they need to know for security: whether updates are available, what the current security status is, which risks remain and what to do in the event of security incidents.
How the principles feed into the CRA
| Principle | Link to the CRA’s essential requirements (in essence) |
|---|---|
| Risk-based approach | Design, development and production with an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks |
| Security by design | Limit attack surfaces, reduce the impact of incidents, control access, protect confidentiality and integrity |
| Secure by default | Making available with a secure by default configuration and the possibility to reset the product to its original state |
| Transparency | Information and instructions for users, indication of the support period, notes on security updates |
Mapping: VamiSec. The standard places the principles up front as orientation for risk management and lifecycle.
Product context and risk acceptance: the foundation of every assessment
Before a single risk is assessed, the standard clarifies what is being talked about: the product in its context – and the yardsticks by which risks are measured.
The product context describes the intended purpose, the reasonably foreseeable use, the functions, the operating environment, an overview of the architecture and the users. If remote data processing forms part of the product – such as a cloud backend developed in-house or on the manufacturer’s behalf without which a function does not work – it is part of this context.
- Intended purpose: what the manufacturer intends the product for, including the information in the instructions for use, advertising and technical documentation.
- Reasonably foreseeable use: how the product is realistically also used – for example in the home network instead of the isolated industrial network.
- Operating environment: networks, connected systems, physical access, environmental conditions.
- Architecture overview: components, interfaces, data flows and trust boundaries.
- Users: roles, knowledge and responsibilities – from the end customer to administration.
Criteria for risk acceptance
Acceptance criteria define which risk a manufacturer is willing to bear and which not. The standard requires them before the assessment; in our view, regulatory requirements and the state of the art, among other things, should feed into them. Without them, every treatment decision remains arbitrary – and not comparable between products.
- 1Capture the context
Document purpose, use, environment, architecture and users per product.
- 2Define the criteria
Company-wide scales for likelihood and impact, thresholds for acceptance and authorities for acceptance decisions.
- 3Maintain the context
Update the context on new functions, markets or user groups and trigger a reassessment.
Assess, treat, communicate, review
The standard’s risk management cycle does not end with the list of measures: residual risks are communicated to users, and the assessment continues until the end of the support period.
- 1Building block 1Product context
Describe purpose, foreseeable use, operating environment, architecture and users.
- 2Building block 2Risk acceptance criteria
Define yardsticks for tolerable and intolerable risks.
- 3Building block 3Risk assessment
Identify assets and their protection goals, derive threats, estimate likelihood and impact and assess against the criteria.
- 4Building block 4Risk treatment
Avoid or reduce risks, document measures, reassess residual risks and accept them with justification.
- 5Building block 5Risk communication
Pass on remaining risks, countermeasures and conditions for secure use to users in an understandable way.
- 6Building block 6Review
Reassess at planned intervals and on occasions such as product changes, a new threat landscape or new vulnerabilities.
How to recognize good assessments
- Traceable: every rating can be traced back to context, threat and criteria.
- Complete: all assets, interfaces and lifecycle phases are considered – including production, updates and decommissioning.
- Linked: risks give rise to requirements, requirements to tests, test results to new assessments.
- Current: date, version and occasion of the last review are documented.
From risk to essential requirement
The risk assessment under the CRA must show whether and how the individual security requirements of the Regulation apply to the product and how they are implemented. The cycle of EN 40000-1-2 provides the justifications for this: a requirement applies because a threat is relevant; it is adequately implemented when the chosen measures reflect the state of the art and traceably bring the risk below the acceptance threshold.
| Example: router for consumers | Risk | Treatment | Residual risk and communication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remote maintenance interface | Takeover via weak credentials | Individual credentials per device, remote maintenance disabled in the delivery state | Note on secure activation in the instructions |
| Update channel | Tampered firmware | Signed updates, verification in the device | Information on available updates and the end of support |
| Remote data processing (app backend) | Leakage of user data | Encryption, access control, logging | Security and data protection notices for users |
Simplified example by VamiSec for illustration – not a reproduction of the standard.
Lifecycle activities: from planning to decommissioning
The second core of the standard describes what must happen during the product’s life for risk management to take effect. Every activity follows the same pattern.
EN 40000-1-2 describes activities, not a process model. For each activity, it defines which inputs it needs, which requirement applies, which output results and by which criteria fulfilment can be assessed. This makes the standard suitable as a framework for process descriptions, audits and the technical documentation.
| Activity or cross-cutting topic | Core of the requirement (in essence) | Typical output |
|---|---|---|
| Planning | Plan, maintain and track activities for the entire lifecycle | Cybersecurity plan |
| Requirements | Derive from context and risk assessment and keep up to date | Requirements catalog with traceability |
| Design | Define architecture and protective measures, consider integration | Threat model, architecture |
| Development | Develop in a secure environment, maintain component list and documentation | Code, SBOM, documentation |
| Verification and validation | Analyze, scan and test – recurring | Test reports |
| Production and delivery | Protect integrity and authenticity up to placing on the market | Signed artifacts, manufacturing records |
| Monitoring and issue management | Observe sources, handle issues without undue delay | Monitoring and triage records |
| Decommissioning | Prepare secure resetting and retirement | Deletion and retirement procedures |
| Third-party components | Due diligence before integration, monitoring afterwards | Component review, SBOM matching |
Summary by VamiSec based on publicly available descriptions of the standard; the text of the standard is authoritative.
Agile, DevSecOps or V-model
Because the standard describes activities rather than phases, they can, in our assessment, also be carried out in parallel and iteratively. In agile teams, requirements, threat modeling and tests move into every iteration; planning lives in the backlog and release gates. What matters is that inputs, outputs and assessment criteria are documented traceably.
Third-party components, open source and SBOM
Hardly any product consists only of its own code. The standard treats third-party components as a topic of their own that accompanies the entire lifecycle.
Before integration comes due diligence, afterwards verification and ongoing monitoring. This corresponds to the CRA’s due diligence obligation: when integrating third-party components, manufacturers must exercise due diligence so that these do not compromise the cybersecurity of the product – expressly also for free and open-source software that has not been made available on the market in the course of a commercial activity.
- Selection: assess maintenance status, security history, response times of the maintainers, origin and license.
- Recording: components with their version in the SBOM – at least the top-level (direct) dependencies are required; the entire chain is better.
- Monitoring: match the SBOM continuously against new vulnerabilities, triage with deadlines.
- Feedback: report vulnerabilities found to maintainers or suppliers and share fixes.
- End of maintenance: plan replacement or your own maintenance before a component drops out of support.
Evidence: technical documentation and conformity assessment
The results of the lifecycle activities are the building blocks of your technical documentation. Who reviews them depends on the product class.
The technical documentation under the CRA contains, among other things, a description of design, development and production, the assessment of cybersecurity risks, information on vulnerability handling including the SBOM, test reports and the list of cited harmonised standards applied – or, where none were applied, the description of the chosen solutions with a list of other technical specifications applied. EN 40000-1-2 provides a structure for most of these building blocks.
| Building block of the technical documentation | What EN 40000-1-2 contributes |
|---|---|
| Description of design, development and production | Results of the activities from planning to production |
| Assessment of cybersecurity risks | Product context, acceptance criteria, assessment, treatment, residual risks |
| Information on the support period | Planning and decommissioning as inputs |
| Vulnerability handling and SBOM | Monitoring, issue management and third-party components – deepened by Part 1-3 |
| Test reports | Verification and validation |
| Standards applied or solutions described | Naming EN 40000-1-2 among the other technical specifications applied – the justification per essential requirement remains yours |
Mapping: VamiSec.
Conformity assessment by product class
| Product class | Possible procedures | Role of EN 40000-1-2 |
|---|---|---|
| Default category | Internal control (module A) | Methodology and structure of the evidence |
| Important, Class I | Module A only with fully applied harmonised standards, common specifications or European certification (at least assurance level “substantial”) or as free and open-source software with public technical documentation; otherwise module B+C or module H | Does not open module A, but eases the assessment by the notified body |
| Important, Class II | Module B+C, module H or European certification (at least assurance level “substantial”); for free and open-source software with public technical documentation also module A | Preparation of the third-party assessment |
| Critical | European certification where required; otherwise as for Class II | Preparation of the certification |
Procedures under the Cyber Resilience Act, presented in simplified form.
Implementation roadmap: anchoring EN 40000-1-2 in 180 days
There is time until the CRA applies in full on 11 December 2027 – but not much, if processes, tools and documentation have to be adapted for several products.
- 1Days 1–30Inventory
Product inventory with CRA classification, support periods and responsible persons; gap analysis of the existing development and risk process against EN 40000-1-2, for example with the readiness check on this page.
- 2Days 31–90Define the methodology
Company-wide risk acceptance criteria, templates for product context and risk assessment, mapping of existing processes such as IEC 62443-4-1 to the lifecycle activities; pilot on a representative product.
- 3Days 91–180Roll out and evidence
Risk assessments for all products, release gates with cybersecurity criteria, automated SBOM and automated monitoring, technical documentation structured according to the standard.
- 4OngoingTrack the standards landscape
Observe Part 1-3, Part 1-4 and the product-specific standards of your category, check citations in the Official Journal and supplement processes.
Roles and responsibility
- Management: approve risk acceptance criteria and resources – residual risks are business decisions.
- Product management: own product context, support period and user information.
- Development and architecture: threat modeling, secure development and tests.
- Production and procurement: integrity through to delivery and diligence for third-party components.
- Product security and PSIRT: monitoring, vulnerability handling and reporting.
Readiness check
EN 40000-1-2 readiness check: How far along are risk management and lifecycle?
In about ten minutes, work through up to 29 questions in eight action areas – with live evaluation, a maturity level per area, your biggest gaps, a 30/90/180-day roadmap and the evidence you should prepare. Your answers stay in your browser.
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Your evaluation
Not all questions answered yet – the evaluation is preliminary.
Your biggest gaps
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The button opens the booking page for a free initial consultation; you can copy your result beforehand or save it as a PDF.
Your answers stay in your browser; nothing is stored or transmitted. The result link contains the profile and levels as abbreviations – share it only selectively.
Foundation
First the Regulation, then the standard: the CRA deep dive
EN 40000-1-2 presupposes the Regulation: which products are covered, which classes apply and which deadlines run is governed by the Cyber Resilience Act. Our CRA deep dive explains the obligations, the page on the CRA guidance the Commission’s interpretation – and this page the methodology for risk and lifecycle.
RegulationObligations, product classes, deadlines
GuidanceThe Commission’s interpretation, not binding
EN 40000-1-2Methodology for risk management and lifecycle
- Reporting obligations since 11 September 2026, full application from 11 December 2027.
- The guidance of 17 November 2026 clarifies, among other things, scope, substantial modification, support period and remote data processing.
- Part 1-3 on vulnerability handling follows as the next part of the series.
The wording of the Regulation and the text of the standard are authoritative. This page summarizes and puts into context; it does not replace legal advice.
VamiGRC
How to implement this with VamiGRC
VamiGRC takes your products through defined release gates, attaches CRA requirements to the right phase and links SBOM, suppliers and evidence – all the way to a prepared notification for BSI and ENISA.
Glossary
Glossary: the terms around EN 40000-1-2
27 terms from the standard and the Regulation – each with the German term.
27 of 27 terms
- EN 40000-1-2Grundsätze, Produktrisikomanagement und Lebenszyklusaktivitäten
- Horizontal European standard on the Cyber Resilience Act with cybersecurity principles, baseline requirements for risk management and lifecycle activities for products with digital elements. Available since 18 November 2026; citation in the Official Journal is not expected.
- EN 40000-1-1Begriffe
- Terminology part of the series with common terms and definitions, published together with Part 1-2; it contains no technical requirements of its own.
- FprEN 40000-1-3Schwachstellenbehandlung
- Part on vulnerability handling after placing on the market. The abbreviation FprEN denotes the draft standard in the formal vote.
- Cyber Resilience Act (CRA)Cyberresilienzverordnung
- EU regulation on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements. In force since 10 December 2024; the rules for conformity assessment bodies have applied since 11 June 2026, the reporting obligations since 11 September 2026, all other obligations from 11 December 2027.
- Product with digital elementsProdukt mit digitalen Elementen
- Software or hardware product and its remote data processing solutions, including components placed on the market separately. The CRA covers it where its intended purpose or reasonably foreseeable use includes a direct or indirect logical or physical data connection to a device or network.
- Harmonised standardHarmonisierte Norm
- European standard developed at the request of the Commission. It gives rise to a presumption of conformity only once its reference has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
- Presumption of conformityKonformitätsvermutung
- Legal consequence whereby a product that complies with a harmonised standard cited in the Official Journal, a common specification or a European cybersecurity certification scheme designated for this purpose is presumed to meet the requirements covered by it; the presumption is rebuttable. EN 40000-1-2 does not give rise to it.
- Standardisation request M/606Normungsauftrag M/606
- Request of the Commission to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI of 3 February 2025 to develop 41 standards in support of the CRA; individual delivery deadlines were adjusted in November 2026.
- Horizontal standardHorizontale Norm
- Standard that applies to all products with digital elements, regardless of product category – like parts EN 40000-1-1 to EN 40000-1-4.
- Vertical (product-specific) standardVertikale Norm
- Product-specific standard for a category of important or critical products, for example from the ETSI EN 304 series. It is meant to build on the framework of EN 40000-1-2.
- Product contextProduktkontext
- Description of the intended purpose, foreseeable use, functions, operating environment, architecture and users of a product – the starting point of the risk assessment.
- Intended purposeBestimmungsgemäßer Zweck
- Use for which the manufacturer intends the product, including the context and conditions of use as specified in the instructions for use, promotional or sales material and technical documentation.
- Reasonably foreseeable useVernünftigerweise vorhersehbare Verwendung
- Use that does not necessarily correspond to the intended purpose stated by the manufacturer but which is likely to result from reasonably foreseeable human behavior or technical operations or interactions.
- Risk acceptance criteriaRisikoakzeptanzkriterien
- Yardsticks defined in advance by which a risk is considered tolerable or intolerable; the basis of every treatment decision.
- Residual riskRestrisiko
- Risk that remains after risk treatment. It is assessed, accepted with justification and communicated to users.
- Risk communicationRisikokommunikation
- Passing on remaining risks, countermeasures and conditions for secure use to users in an understandable form.
- Security by designSicherheit durch Gestaltung
- Principle of anchoring security in architecture and implementation from the start – with a small attack surface, least privilege and defense in depth.
- Secure by defaultSichere Voreinstellungen
- Principle of making products available in a secure delivery state: secure default values, unneeded services disabled, simple reset to the original state.
- Support periodUnterstützungszeitraum
- Period during which the manufacturer must handle vulnerabilities effectively. It reflects the expected use time and is at least five years; if the product is expected to be in use for a shorter time, it corresponds to that use time.
- Software bill of materials (SBOM)Software-Stückliste (SBOM)
- Machine-readable inventory of a product’s components. The CRA requires it in a commonly used format and at least covering the top-level dependencies.
- Remote data processingDatenfernverarbeitung
- Data processing at a distance for which the software is designed and developed by, or under the responsibility of, the manufacturer, and the absence of which would prevent the product from performing one of its functions.
- Third-party componentDrittkomponente
- Software or hardware component obtained from third parties, including free and open-source software. The manufacturer’s due diligence obligation applies to it.
- Notified bodyBenannte Stelle
- Notified conformity assessment body that carries out procedures such as EU-type examination or the assessment of full quality assurance.
- Internal control (module A)Interne Kontrolle (Modul A)
- Conformity assessment by the manufacturer itself. Always possible for the default category; for Class I only with fully applied harmonised standards, common specifications or a suitable European certification scheme. For free and open-source software in Classes I and II, it is sufficient to make the technical documentation public when placing the product on the market.
- Technical documentationTechnische Dokumentation
- Documents with which the manufacturer demonstrates fulfilment of the essential requirements – including the risk assessment, test reports and the standards applied or solutions described.
- DOR, DAV, DOA, DOP, DOWCEN-Umsetzungstermine
- Ratification, availability of the definitive text to the national standardisation bodies, latest date for national announcement, latest date for national publication and latest date for withdrawal of conflicting national standards. For EN 40000-1-2: 2 November 2026, 18 November 2026, 28 February 2027, 31 May 2027, 31 May 2027.
- CEN-CLC/JTC 13/WG 9Gemeinsame Arbeitsgruppe von CEN und CENELEC
- Joint working group of CEN and CENELEC for horizontal cybersecurity standards for products with digital elements; the secretariat is held by the Dutch standardisation institute NEN.
FAQ
Frequently asked questions about EN 40000-1-2
Short answers to questions that product management, development and compliance ask about EN 40000-1-2.
The standard sets out general cybersecurity principles, baseline requirements for the management of cybersecurity risks and activities across the entire lifecycle of products with digital elements – from design to the end of support and decommissioning. It applies horizontally to all product categories and forms the framework for the product-specific standards on the Cyber Resilience Act.
It was developed under the standardisation request for the CRA but, according to the CEN project entry, will not be cited in the Official Journal of the European Union. It therefore does not give rise to a presumption of conformity. It is a published European standard that manufacturers apply voluntarily as a methodology.
CEN and CENELEC ratified it on 2 November 2026; the definitive text has been available since 18 November 2026, and on 19 November 2026 the organizations announced the publication. Nationally, the standard must be adopted by 31 May 2027 at the latest, in Germany as DIN EN 40000-1-2.
No. The standard structures risk assessment, development process and documentation, but contains no product-specific technical requirements. You continue to provide the evidence that your product meets the essential requirements of the Regulation yourself – in the technical documentation, with a description of the chosen solutions.
No. For internal control in Class I, harmonised standards, common specifications or a European cybersecurity certification scheme of at least assurance level “substantial” must be fully applied. Since Part 1-2 is not cited, the route until then is via a notified body. Independently of the standard, there is an exception for free and open-source software whose technical documentation is public when it is placed on the market.
Part 1-1 contains the terminology, Part 1-2 principles, risk management and lifecycle activities, Part 1-3 vulnerability handling and the planned Part 1-4 generic technical security requirements. So far, Parts 1-1 and 1-2 have been published; Part 1-3 is in the formal vote, Part 1-4 in preparation.
Six building blocks: establish the product context, define risk acceptance criteria, assess risks, treat risks, communicate residual risks to users and review the assessment regularly and on specific occasions – for example on product changes or new vulnerabilities.
For software placed on the market as a product with digital elements – such as installable applications, apps or firmware – yes. Pure online services are not in themselves a product within the meaning of the CRA. They form part of a product’s remote data processing if the product manufacturer designed and developed their software itself or under its responsibility and the product could not perform one of its functions without them; they then belong in the product context and risk assessment.
No. The development process under IEC 62443-4-1 overlaps strongly with the lifecycle activities of EN 40000-1-2. A mapping makes sense: which practices cover which activity, and where are building blocks missing? Frequently this concerns risk acceptance criteria, communication of residual risks to users, decommissioning and the ongoing monitoring of third-party components.
No. An ISMS manages the organization’s information security risks. EN 40000-1-2 requires risk management per product that includes the users and the entire product lifecycle. Methodology, roles and tools from the ISMS can, however, be readily reused.
The reporting obligations for actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe security incidents apply independently of the standard. EN 40000-1-2 supports them through the Monitoring and issue management activity: those who systematically observe sources and handle issues without undue delay recognize reportable cases in good time. Vulnerability handling in detail is to be governed by Part 1-3.
European standards are distributed by the national standardisation bodies, in Germany by DIN through DIN Media. When the national version appears depends on the respective publication schedule – by 31 May 2027 at the latest. The draft has been available since March 2026 as E DIN EN 40000-1-2 in German and English versions.
Standards & Sources
The content on this page is based on the following publicly available guides and studies.
CEN-CENELEC · 2026
CRA Milestone Unlocked: First European standards supporting CRA are now available! ↗
Announcement of 19 November 2026 on the publication of EN 40000-1-1 and EN 40000-1-2 – working group, contributors and next parts
CEN-CENELEC · 2026
EN 40000-1-2:2026 – Project entry JT013089 (CEN/CLC/JTC 13) ↗
Primary source for title, scope, status, implementation dates and citation status; retrieved on 22 November 2026
European Parliament and Council of the EU · 2024
Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act) ↗
Legal basis – essential requirements, risk assessment, technical documentation, conformity assessment, reporting obligations
European Commission · 2025
Commission Implementing Decision C(2025) 618 – Standardisation request M/606 in support of the Cyber Resilience Act
Request of 3 February 2025 to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI for 41 horizontal and product-specific standards
European Commission · 2026
Commission Implementing Decision C(2026) 7861 amending Implementing Decision C(2025) 618 ↗
Decision of 10 November 2026; replaces the annex with the delivery deadlines of the standardisation request
European Commission · 2026
Annex to Commission Implementing Decision C(2026) 7861 – list of requested standards and deadlines ↗
New deadlines: 30 November 2026 for risk-based design, development and production and for vulnerability handling, 30 October 2027 for the remaining horizontal standards, 31 January 2027 for the vertical standards
European Commission · 2026
Commission guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, C/2026/6013 ↗
Interpretation of scope, substantial modification, support period, open source and remote data processing; OJ C of 17 November 2026
European Commission · 2022
Commission Notice – The ‘Blue Guide’ on the implementation of EU product rules 2022 (2022/C 247/01) ↗
Fundamentals on harmonised standards, citation in the Official Journal and presumption of conformity in the New Legislative Framework
DIN · 2026
E DIN EN 40000-1-2:2026-03 – Draft, German and English version prEN 40000-1-2:2025 ↗
German draft standard (123 pages, German and English), at the time under the title “Principles for cyber resilience” (German: “Grundsätze für die Cyberresilienz”)
European Commission · 2026
Cyber Resilience Act – Commission policy page ↗
Overview, implementation status, standardisation and reporting platform
IEC · 2018
IEC 62443-4-1:2018 – Secure product development lifecycle requirements ↗
Requirements for the secure development process for industrial automation components; closely related to the lifecycle activities of EN 40000-1-2
ISO/IEC · 2018
ISO/IEC 29147:2018 – Vulnerability disclosure ↗
Coordinated vulnerability disclosure; reference standard for vulnerability handling
ISO/IEC · 2019
ISO/IEC 30111:2019 – Vulnerability handling processes ↗
Internal processes for handling vulnerabilities; reference standard for vulnerability handling
ETSI · 2024
ETSI EN 303 645 – Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements ↗
Widely used baseline requirements for connected consumer devices; not a CRA standard
Bringing EN 40000-1-2 into your product development?
In an initial consultation, we examine how your risk assessment, your development process and your technical documentation fit EN 40000-1-2 and the requirements of the Cyber Resilience Act – and where the biggest gaps are.