The Commission’s CRA Guidance: what the interpretation means for software, devices and open source

On 17 November 2026 the European Commission published its guidance on applying the Cyber Resilience Act in the Official Journal: 257 paragraphs and 67 examples on scope, open source, substantial modification, the support period, important products, remote data processing and reporting obligations. This page puts the clarifications into context — with a decision tree, a case navigator and an integrated gap analysis.

Last updated: November 2026 · Valeri Milke, ISO 27001 & ISO 42001 Lead Auditor

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C/2026/6013 · Official Journal of 17 Nov 2026 · not binding
  1. 01Scope
  2. 02Open source
  3. 03Risk
  4. 04Classes
  5. 05Modification
  6. 06Support
  7. 07Remote processing
  8. 08Reporting
257paragraphs in 9 chapters67examples5use cases
Topic orbit of the CRA guidance: eight topic areas — scope, open source, risk assessment, important and critical products, substantial modification, support period, remote data processing and reporting obligations — orbit communication C/2026/6013; on the inside the Commission’s interpretation, on the outside the obligations under the Regulation. The division into eight areas is VamiSec’s mapping to the nine chapters of the guidance.
257paragraphs in nine chapters — the consultation draft of March 2026 had 232
67examples, 14 of them new compared with the draft — none replaces a case-by-case assessment
5use cases on remote data processing — from the mobile banking app to the cellular network
24 hdeadline for the early warning to the CSIRT and ENISA after becoming aware of an actively exploited vulnerability or a severe incident — mandatory since 11 September 2026

The Cyber Resilience Act has been in force since 10 December 2024; its reporting obligations have applied since 11 September 2026, and the other obligations of economic operators apply from 11 December 2027. In its guidance, the Commission sets out how it interprets key concepts — from the question of when software is a product, through open source and substantial modification, to core functionality and remote data processing. The guidance is not binding, but it is expressly also addressed to market surveillance authorities and notified bodies. Throughout this page, we distinguish between what the Regulation requires, how the Commission interprets it and what VamiSec recommends.

From the Regulation in 2024 to the guidance in 2026 and the date of application in 2027

The milestones of the Cyber Resilience Act and its guidance — what already applies today and what is still to come.

Nine clarifications in the guidance — from its status to the reporting obligations

Click a card to read the clarification — the order follows a product’s path: from the status of the guidance through scope, placing on the market and open source to modifications, core functionality, remote data processing and reporting obligations.

Interactive

Does the CRA affect me — and what does the guidance say?

Up to six questions along the criteria the guidance uses to delimit the scope: software or online service, data connection, open source, placing on the market and core functionality. Check each offering separately — every edition, every separately distributed module. The result is an orientation by VamiSec based on the guidance, not legal advice and not a case-by-case assessment.

Your path
  1. ?

1: Do you supply hardware or software that runs on the user’s side — as a device, part, installed app, download, embedded firmware or on a physical medium?

1

Do you supply hardware or software that runs on the user’s side — as a device, part, installed app, download, embedded firmware or on a physical medium?

Yes for devices with or without embedded software, parts such as circuit boards or chips, apps, desktop programs, browser extensions and applications built with web technologies for local execution — also for source code that you supply to customers as a product. No if users only access your software remotely, for example as a web application in the browser, as SaaS or as a website.

Topic navigator

Ten topics in the guidance — from scope to reporting

The guidance explains selected key provisions of the Cyber Resilience Act. The topic navigator arranges its chapters along the product journey — from the question of whether a product is in scope to the support period — and adds three cross-cutting topics. For each topic, you will see typical misconceptions, references, next steps, a review question and evidence. The guidance reflects the Commission’s non-binding interpretation; the structure, weighting and measures are VamiSec’s own assessments.

Product journey · Guidance 2.2, 2.4–2.6 · Examples 3–6, 8–11

Scope & product boundaries

The guidance draws the line where software reaches the user: anything that is downloaded, installed and executed on the user’s device — app, desktop program, browser extension — is a product with digital elements. A web application that is merely accessed in the browser is not, on that basis alone; it is covered only to the extent that, as remote data processing, it supports a product function. Drivers and companion apps belong to the device if it cannot function in accordance with its intended purpose without them, whatever channel they come through. A genuine data connection is also required; signals that merely trigger or power a function are not enough. Complex systems with long lifecycles remain in scope.

ReferenceGuidance 2.2 to 2.6 (paras 17–32) · Examples 3–6, 8–11 · fn. 10 · CRA Art. 2(1), Art. 3(1), (2) and (4)

Typical misconceptions

  • “Web technology is never relevant under the CRA.” — Web-based desktop apps, browser extensions and locally installed clients are products with digital elements. (high)
  • “Our web app falls entirely under the CRA.” — An application used exclusively in the browser is not a product in itself; it is covered only to the extent that, as remote data processing, it supports a product function. (medium)
  • “The app in the store is a separate product.” — If the device needs it to be operated, configured or used, it forms one product with the hardware and is deemed placed on the market at the same time as the devices. (high)
  • “Every device with electronics is in scope.” — What matters is the exchange of digitally encoded information; signals that only trigger or power a function are not a data connection. (medium)
  • “Long-lived installations are exempt.” — Complex systems remain in scope; constraints must be documented, and risks mitigated by other means and periodically reassessed. (high)
  • “Our product website has to become CRA-compliant.” — A purely informational site is not a product; a portal that issues credentials or tokens required for operation is a different matter. (low)

References

Guidance 2.2 · paras 17–21 · Examples 3–6Guidance 2.4 · para. 25 · Examples 8–9Guidance 2.5 · paras 26–28Guidance 2.6 · paras 29–32 · Examples 10–11 · fn. 10Guidance 8.1.2 · para. 194 (websites)CRA Art. 2(1), Art. 3(1), (2) and (4)

What to do now

  • Build a product inventory: record for each offering whether software executes on the user’s side (app, desktop, browser extension, client) or is merely accessed in the browser.
  • Assign companion software: treat drivers, apps and configuration tools without which a device cannot function in accordance with its intended purpose as part of the product — regardless of the distribution channel.
  • Check the data connection: is digitally encoded information exchanged between sender and receiver, or is a function merely triggered? Document the result with reasons.
  • Map web applications and portals against the products: if the remote processing supports a product function, it belongs in the risk assessment and documentation as remote data processing.
  • For complex systems, record technical constraints such as legacy protocols or interoperability requirements, define compensatory measures and disclose them in the documentation and user information.
  • Where technically feasible, implement the secure protocol and enable it by default; allow older protocols only where they are demonstrably needed for interoperability.
  • Periodically reassess constraints during the support period and update the product as soon as they can be lifted or reduced.
Review question for product management

Can you show, with reasons, for every offering whether it is a product with digital elements — and which software, companion apps and remote processing belong to it?

Evidence you can present

  • Product and variant inventory with a scope decision for each offering
  • Assignment of drivers, apps and companion software to the respective device
  • Reasoned assessment of data connection and remote processing
  • Documented constraints of complex systems with compensatory measures
  • Protocol configuration with secure defaults and justified exceptions

Scope & product boundaries

Case navigator

All 67 examples and 5 use cases in the guidance — searchable and filterable

The Commission illustrates its interpretation with 67 numbered examples and five use cases on remote data processing. The navigator summarises each case in our own words: the outcome in the Commission’s view and what it means for manufacturers. Filter by chapter and outcome, search for product types such as app, printer, router or library, and copy the filtered list as a checklist. The examples are not binding and do not replace a case-by-case assessment.

67numbered examples in chapters 2 to 7 of the guidance
5use cases on remote data processing: mobile banking, thermostat, e-Reader, industrial robot, cellular network
22cases on free and open-source software — the largest group
17cases on substantial modifications, repairs, spare parts and software updates
72 of 72 cases
ExampleCaseOutcome & implicationsSection
Example 1ScopeSoftware version by download, copies sold on different daysPlacing on the marketBoth copies of version 1.0.0 are deemed placed on the market on the day of the first offer — including the one bought two weeks later. For standalone software, what counts is the first offer of a finished version, not the individual sale; later downloads count as making available. For manufacturers, this means: the date of placing on the market is tied to the version — record it for each version, because conformity and the support period are linked to it.Section 2.1In scope
Example 2ScopeFollow-up version 1.0.1 without substantial modification — new date of placing on the market?Placing on the marketNo. The copy of version 1.0.1 is also deemed placed on the market on the day of the first offer of 1.0.0, because the update is not a substantial modification. Iterations that are not substantial modifications do not require a new conformity assessment procedure and do not shift the date. For manufacturers, this means: the classification of each update determines whether there is a new placing on the market — document it for each release.Section 2.1In scopeModification & spare parts
Example 3ScopeMobile app from the app store, installed on the smartphoneSoftware as a product with digital elementsThe app is supplied to the user and executes on the user’s device — it is a product with digital elements. It may fall within the scope of the CRA if it is placed on the market in the course of a commercial activity, whether in return for payment or free of charge. For app providers, this means: free of charge does not automatically mean out of scope; the commercial context is decisive. Also check which remote processing the app needs for its functions.Section 2.2In scope
Example 4ScopeDesktop application built with web technologies, packaged for local installationSoftware as a product with digital elementsAn application built with web technologies is also a product with digital elements as soon as it is supplied for local installation and runs on the user’s device; if it is placed on the market in the course of a commercial activity, it may fall within the scope of the CRA. For manufacturers, this means: the technology is not decisive — what counts is whether the software executes on the user’s side. According to the guidance, the same applies to browser extensions.Section 2.2In scope
Example 5ScopeWeb application used only in the browser, or locally installed client?Software as a product with digital elementsThe web application used only through the browser is not a product and does not fall within the scope of the CRA, unless it supports the functionality of a product. The locally installed client, by contrast, is a product; if it relies for its functions on processing at a distance that qualifies as remote data processing, that processing is part of the product. For SaaS providers, this means: check for each offering whether there is a client — and which back-end it depends on.Section 2.2Out of scopeIn scope
Example 6ScopeWebsite that only displays informationSoftware as a product with digital elementsA website that merely provides information and does not support any product function is not a product with digital elements and does not fall within the scope of the CRA. It is different where a website enables a function — for example as a portal that issues credentials or tokens required for operation; it can then be remote data processing. For manufacturers, this means: product pages and help centres stay out of scope, while login and control portals should be scrutinised.Section 2.2Out of scope
Example 7ScopeSource code licence to a customer that adapts and compiles the codeComputer codeCompany A places the source code, supplied as a text file, on the market and is subject to the CRA, even though company B still has to adapt and compile it. According to the English version, A is not responsible for the CRA compliance of B’s subsequent adaptations; the German version states the opposite at this point. For manufacturers, this means: code licences to customers are products — the boundaries of responsibility should be clearly set out in the contract.Section 2.3In scopeManufacturer role
Example 8ScopeNetwork printer with drivers for download on the manufacturer’s websiteCombination of hardware and software forming a product with digital elementsPrinter and drivers together constitute a single product with digital elements, although they are supplied through different channels: without the drivers, the printer cannot fulfil its intended purpose. Such software is deemed placed on the market at the same time as the devices. For manufacturers, this means: drivers, configuration and management software belong in the device’s risk assessment, technical documentation and vulnerability handling.Section 2.4In scopeManufacturer role
Example 9ScopeFitness wearable with the manufacturer’s separately downloaded smartphone appCombination of hardware and software forming a product with digital elementsWearable and app together constitute a single product, because they are designed and intended to operate together — even if the app comes separately from the app store. It displays measurements and history and configures the device. For manufacturers, this means: the companion app is part of the device’s conformity assessment, documentation and vulnerability handling; app updates are therefore updates of the product.Section 2.4In scopeManufacturer role
Example 10ScopeInteroperability with legacy systems requires an older, less secure protocolComplex systemsThe less secure protocol may be implemented where this is necessary for the interoperability that forms part of the intended purpose and the risks are identified and mitigated through other means. If supporting both is technically feasible, the Commission expects the secure protocol to be enabled by default, and the older one only where interoperability requires it. For manufacturers, this means: document and disclose the justification, compensatory measures and default setting.Section 2.6Obligations & evidence
Example 11ScopeAutomation system with microcontrollers purchased before the date of applicationComplex systemsThe manufacturer includes the purchased microcontrollers in the system’s risk assessment; if it identifies no specific risks, it integrates one of them and ensures that the system as a whole meets the essential requirements. For manufacturers, this means: legacy stocks of components are not an obstacle — what counts is the assessment within the overall product. If risks emerge, compensatory measures and documentation are needed.Section 2.6Manufacturer roleObligations & evidence
Example 12ScopeMicrocontroller developed before 11 December 2027 and still placed on the market afterwardsProducts with digital elements designed before the CRA entered into applicationNo redesign is needed if a current risk assessment shows that the original design incorporates appropriate and effective measures. Historical design and test documentation does not have to be recreated; for variants based on the same design and with the same risk profile, representative evidence for the product family may suffice. For manufacturers, this means: legacy designs need a risk assessment and technical documentation — vulnerability handling, conformity assessment and CE marking remain mandatory.Section 2.7In scopeObligations & evidence

Counting and summaries: VamiSec, as of 21 November 2026, based on the Commission guidance on the application of the Cyber Resilience Act (C/2026/6013, Official Journal of the EU of 17 November 2026). The cases are summarised in our own words; the outcome filters are a VamiSec classification. The guidance is not binding; only the Court of Justice of the EU can give an authoritative interpretation, and the examples do not replace a case-by-case assessment. Where the official German version differs from the English one (for instance in Example 7), the summaries follow the English version.

In depth

The CRA guidance in detail: 14 chapters from scope to the roadmap for 11 December 2027

These 14 chapters cover the status and structure of the guidance, placing software on the market, web applications and source code, hardware with companion software, legacy designs, free and open-source software, substantial modification and spare parts, the support period, important and critical products, risk assessment and components, remote data processing, reporting obligations and the interplay with other legal acts — in each case distinguishing between what the Commission interprets, what the Regulation requires and what VamiSec recommends.

01Chapter 1

What the guidance is — and what it is not: mandate, status, structure

In Communication C/2026/6013, the Commission sets out how it understands key concepts of the Cyber Resilience Act. The guidance is not binding, but it is intended to help economic operators comply and to support harmonised enforcement by the authorities. This chapter sets out the mandate, origins, status and structure of the guidance and shows what has changed compared with the consultation draft.

The “Commission guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act)” is a Communication from the Commission. It was published on 17 November 2026 in the Official Journal of the European Union, C series, under number C/2026/6013; according to the Official Journal metadata, the underlying Commission document C(2026) 7851 is dated 9 November 2026. Its subject is the Regulation on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements. The Regulation entered into force on 10 December 2024, its reporting obligations for actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents have applied since 11 September 2026, and it will apply in full from 11 December 2027.

257consecutively numbered paragraphs in nine sections
67examples, 14 of them new compared with the consultation draft
5use cases on remote data processing, from the mobile banking application to the cellular network
4mandatory topics that the Regulation sets for the guidance

The mandate: guidance required by the Regulation itself

The Regulation requires the Commission to publish guidance to assist economic operators in applying it — with a particular focus on facilitating compliance by microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises. The Commission must address at least four topics: the scope, with particular regard to remote data processing solutions and free and open-source software; the notion of support periods; the interplay with other Union law; and the concept of substantial modification. The guidance is not addressed only to manufacturers, importers and distributors. It is also expressly intended to support the activities of market surveillance authorities, notifying authorities and notified bodies, so that the Regulation is enforced in a harmonised manner across the Union.

From the FAQs through the consultation to the final version

As early as 3 December 2025, the Commission had published frequently asked questions (FAQs) intended to help with preparations for implementation; the guidance itself refers to them. The Commission put the draft guidance out to public consultation from 3 March to 13 April 2026, also involving the Expert Group on Cybersecurity of products with digital elements. The final version followed in November 2026. Our assessment of how the two documents relate: the guidance is the more detailed document and the one expressly required by the Regulation; it does not say whether or how the Commission will adapt the FAQs. Anyone who has based scope or role decisions on the FAQs should check them against the guidance.

What the guidance is not

The guidance is not binding for economic operators or other actors. Only the Court of Justice of the European Union can give an authoritative interpretation of the Regulation; in the guidance, the Commission sets out its interpretation in order to support compliance. The examples illustrate this interpretation but do not replace a case-by-case assessment — according to the guidance, such an assessment will always be necessary. Nor does the guidance cover the Regulation in its entire scope. It explains the rationale of certain key provisions and how they could be implemented in practice. And it concerns only the Cyber Resilience Act, not other Union legal acts.

The Commission may consider further guidance — this is not a commitment — for example for manufacturers that are also subject to other Union harmonisation legislation. As examples, it mentions the interplay with the AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, and with DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector. What the guidance already says about vehicle legislation and existing EU type-examination certificates is covered in Chapter 13.

Structure: nine sections, 67 examples

Section of the guidanceWhat it coversExamplesChapter on this page
1 IntroductionObjectives of the Regulation, mandate, consultation, status of the guidance—1
2 ScopePlacing on the market, software as a product, computer code, hardware with software, data connection, complex systems, legacy designs1–⁠122 to 5
3 Free and open-source softwareResponsibility, placing on the market and monetisation, open-source software stewards, contributors, scenarios13–⁠346
4 Substantial modifications and spare partsPhysical repairs, spare parts, software updates, consequences of a substantial modification35–⁠517
5 Support periodDetermination and minimum duration, new versions, relationship with substantial modification52–⁠568
6 Important and critical productsCore functionality, conformity assessment, presumption of conformity57–⁠659
7 Cybersecurity risk assessmentRisk treatment, due diligence for components, product families66–⁠6710
8 Remote data processingAssessment criteria, reliance on third-party solutions, use cases5 use cases11
9 Additional elementsReporting obligations, vulnerability handling, interplay with other legislation—12 and 13

Section titles abbreviated. Chapter 14 of this page has no counterpart in the guidance: it is a roadmap and is marked as a VamiSec recommendation.

What has changed compared with the draft

Compared with the consultation draft of March 2026, the final version has grown considerably: from 232 to 257 numbered paragraphs and from 55 to 67 examples. In total, 14 examples are new, one has been dropped and two have been merged; the text is around 23 per cent longer. Entire sections are new: on software as a product with digital elements, on the consequences of a substantial modification, separately for third parties and the original manufacturer, on the relationship between substantial modification and the support period, and on effective and regular tests. The legal nature is unchanged: the final version is not binding either.

TopicWhat the final version changesOur assessment
Software as a productNew section: software executed locally is a product, expressly including browser extensions and locally installed applications built with web technologies. Software that executes remotely and is merely accessed is not a product on that basis alone; websites are covered only as remote data processing (Examples 3 to 6).Web applications used exclusively in the browser are not a product in their own right — they remain covered only to the extent that, as remote data processing, they support the functionality of a product.
Free and open-source softwareWhat matters is a price charged for the software itself; the free version is not placed on the market, even in the open-core model; paid support does not in itself constitute placing on the market. Example 13 on contributors and statements on changes in a steward’s status are new.Manufacturer obligations apply to the monetised edition. For the free version, legal persons are subject to the steward obligations; natural persons are subject to none.
Spare partsThe exemption applies only where the part is specifically supplied for repair or to extend durability, as apparent from the context of the supply. Whether a part is “identical” is measured by its functional role and security-relevant characteristics. Example 38 reaches the opposite conclusion to the draft; Example 39 is new.A part with a different chipset or new firmware can remain exempt if the security-relevant characteristics stay the same and it is demonstrably supplied as a spare part.
Software updatesNew functionalities that do not, in themselves, alter the risk profile are not a substantial modification either, nor are security updates that introduce no new risks — even where they involve significant technical changes. Materially changed product boundaries or dependencies, such as new data flows or externally reachable interfaces, are treated as warning signs.Feature updates without new or increased risks do not trigger a new conformity assessment. Architecture, data flows and interfaces become the key checkpoints.
Consequences of a substantial modificationRestructured by third parties and original manufacturer. Third parties bear manufacturer obligations only for the modified part, as long as the cybersecurity of the product as a whole is not negatively affected; anyone who assembles components into a product of their own is integrating (Example 51). The same proportionality applies to the original manufacturer for products placed on the market before 11 December 2027.A substantial modification to an existing product does not automatically require full compliance of the entire product — it does, however, if it negatively affects the product’s cybersecurity as a whole.
Support periodNew section: a substantial modification requires a reassessment, but neither automatically resets nor automatically extends the period. The period is recalculated where the factors determining the expected use time change (Examples 54 to 56).Releases with substantial modifications do not extend the period by themselves; a support period must nevertheless be specified for every substantially modified version.
Remote data processingClarified boundary: what is covered are the software modules responsible for the functionality of the product, together with the interfaces those modules use with external services. Further back-end systems with which the product does not directly interact are not included.The boundary expressly belongs in the technical documentation. According to the guidance, downstream systems remain external dependencies to be addressed in the risk assessment.
Reporting obligations and testsClarified: the Regulation’s reporting obligations have applied since 11 September 2026 to all products in scope, including those placed on the market before 11 December 2027 and after the end of the support period; there is no retroactive reporting where the active exploitation was already known before 11 September 2026. A new section covers effective and regular tests without a fixed schedule.Reporting processes must cover the entire portfolio, including existing products. You should document the point at which you became aware in each case.

A selection of changes verifiable in the wording. Further clarifications concern, among other things, separately offered modules, risk treatment and known exploitable vulnerabilities. All example numbers refer to the final version; from Example 3 onwards, practically all numbers have shifted compared with the draft.

02Chapter 2

Placing software on the market: version, copy, variant

When a device is placed on the market is a matter of well-established practice. For standalone software that can be downloaded any number of times, the Commission considers that separate guidance is needed. The guidance takes the version as its reference point: what counts is its first offering, and every variant counts as a separate product.

Making available and placing on the market

The Regulation applies to products with digital elements made available on the Union market. Making available on the market means any supply for distribution or use in the course of a commercial activity, whether in return for payment or free of charge; placing on the market is the first making available. Citing the “Blue Guide”, the Commission’s 2022 guide on the implementation of EU product rules, the guidance emphasises that both concepts refer to each individual product, not to a type of product — whether it was manufactured as an individual unit or in series. For machinery or radio equipment this is well established, and the “Blue Guide” contains its own examples on this.

For standalone software, the notion of the individual unit fits only to a limited extent. There are no physical limits on production or stock, and every download creates a new, identical copy. The Commission resolves this as follows: once the manufacturing phase is complete and the software is offered to prospective users on the Union market, the manufacturer is regarded as having manufactured multiple copies of the same product. The software is placed on the market at the moment of the first offering for distribution or use. Subsequent downloads or distribution of this version are instances of making available — as long as the version is not modified in a way that affects compliance with the Regulation.

All copies of a version: one date

Each copy remains an individual product with digital elements. According to the guidance, however, all copies of a version are considered to be placed on the market at the same time, regardless of when possession or use of the individual copy is transferred to a customer. Two examples in the guidance show the consequences, including for updates.

ExampleSequence of eventsDate of placing on the market
Example 1Company A first supplies version 1.0.0 of its software X for distribution via its website on 1 January 2028. Customer 1 purchases a copy on the same day, customer 2 on 15 January 2028.Both copies: 1 January 2028
Example 2As in Example 1, but on 15 January 2028 version 1.0.1 is released, which does not constitute a substantial modification. Customer 2 purchases a copy of version 1.0.1 on 30 January 2028.Copies of 1.0.0 and 1.0.1: 1 January 2028

The dates are example dates from the guidance.

Example 2 illustrates the second rule. Subsequent iterations are considered newly placed on the market only if they constitute a substantial modification. Iterations without a substantial modification do not require a new conformity assessment procedure and leave the date of placing on the market unchanged. The guidance addresses when an update is substantial in a separate section; Chapter 7 summarises the criteria.

Variants are separate products

Variants are a different matter. Where software differs in its included components, configurations or enabled functionalities — the guidance mentions builds for different operating systems and bundles with differing feature sets — these are not copies of the same product. They should be treated as distinct products with digital elements for the purposes of placing on the market, each with its own date of placing on the market. This need not mean additional documentation work: according to the guidance, variants of a product family with the same architecture, the same security-relevant design, the same intended purpose and the same risks can share one risk assessment, one set of technical documentation and one conformity assessment procedure (Chapter 10).

Copy

Every further download or sale of a version already offered. Not a new placing on the market but making available; the date of the first offering remains (Example 1).

New version without substantial modification

Bug fixes and updates that are not a substantial modification. No new conformity assessment procedure; the date of placing on the market remains unchanged (Example 2).

New version with substantial modification

Considered newly placed on the market. Before it is made available, a conformity assessment procedure focusing on the substantially modified parts is required (Chapter 7).

Variant

Different components, configurations or enabled functionalities, such as one build per operating system or an edition with a larger feature set. A distinct product with its own placing on the market.

Only for standalone software

These timing rules apply exclusively insofar as the product is standalone software. Where software is combined with hardware, a different logic applies: software that is necessary to operate a device in accordance with its intended purpose is placed on the market at the same point in time as the hardware units (Chapter 4). Under the Regulation, manufacturers may keep older versions accessible in public software archives; users must then be informed clearly and in an easily accessible manner about the risks of unsupported software.

03Chapter 3

Software, web applications, websites and source code: where the product begins

Not all software is a product with digital elements. The guidance draws the line according to where software executes: what runs on the user’s side is a product; what is merely accessed remotely is not, on that basis alone. For source code, it separates two questions — whether code is software, and whether passing it on constitutes placing on the market.

Four types of product

The Regulation defines a product with digital elements as a software or hardware product and its remote data processing solutions, including software or hardware components placed on the market separately. It is covered where its intended purpose or reasonably foreseeable use includes a direct or indirect logical or physical data connection to a device or network. From this, the guidance derives four types:

  • Standalone software, such as apps and computer programs, whether digitally or physically distributed.
  • Hardware with embedded software, such as Internet-of-Things devices, laptops and tablets.
  • Standalone hardware, such as integrated circuits and motherboards.
  • Any combination of hardware and software supplied separately but intended to operate together.

The criterion: where does the software run?

Standalone software falls under the Regulation where it is placed on the market as a product. According to the guidance, it must be distinguished from the remote provision of services, which does not fall within the scope. A software product exists where the software is provided to a user, obtained by that user and operated on, or as part of, an electronic information system on the user’s side. This applies to software that is downloaded, installed or otherwise supplied and executes on the user’s side — expressly including browser extensions and applications developed using web technologies but supplied for local execution.

By contrast, software that executes remotely and is merely accessed by the user is not, on that basis alone, a product with digital elements. Under the Regulation, processing at a distance is covered only to the extent that it is necessary for a product to perform its functions — as remote data processing, not as a product in its own right. According to the guidance, this typically concerns web applications, including progressive web apps, that are accessed exclusively through a web browser. Websites may run on the user’s device to a limited extent, but they are not themselves products; they are covered only where they support the functionality of a product and thus qualify as remote data processing.

ExampleScenarioCommission’s classification
Example 3Mobile app from an app store, installed on a smartphoneProduct with digital elements; where placed on the market in the course of a commercial activity, it may fall within the scope
Example 4Desktop application built using web technologies and packaged for local installationProduct with digital elements; in the course of a commercial activity, it may be covered
Example 5Web application accessed only through the browserNot a product; not covered unless it supports the functionality of a product
Example 5The same application as a locally installed clientProduct with digital elements; where the client relies on remote data processing to perform functions, that processing is also part of the product
Example 6Website that merely presents information to visitorsNot a product; not in scope

For apps and clients, the Commission uses cautious wording: they may be covered where they are placed on the market in the course of a commercial activity. In the official German language version of Example 5, the second paragraph says “Kunde” (customer); what is meant is the client.

Source code: software, yes — placing on the market, not always

The Regulation defines software as the part of an electronic information system which consists of computer code. According to the guidance, computer code covers both machine code, i.e. binary instructions executed directly by the processor, and source code, which is written in a programming language and must be compiled or interpreted. Whether a given supply of code amounts to placing on the market is a separate question. It requires a supply in the course of a commercial activity, and this is often not the case for source code. The guidance names three cases without placing on the market:

  • Anyone who shares free and open-source software in publicly accessible repositories is generally not placing it on the market (Chapter 6).
  • Unfinished code shared during the design and development phase, for example for testing or review, is not considered placed on the market, because the manufacturing phase is not complete.
  • Sample or demo code in tutorials and training materials is likewise not considered placed on the market.

In addition, the guidance recalls that the Regulation allows unfinished software, such as alpha versions, beta versions or release candidates, to be made available on the market even if it does not comply, as long as it is made available only for the period necessary for testing and feedback. Where, by contrast, a manufacturer provides its customers with computer code as a product, that code is considered placed on the market — regardless of whether it is machine code or source code. In Example 7 of the guidance, company A licenses to company B the source code of a customisable internal platform, provided as a text file. Although B still has to adapt and compile the code, A is placing it on the market and is subject to the Regulation.

According to the English version, A is expressly not responsible for B’s subsequent adaptations and compilation. The official German language version published in the Official Journal says the opposite at this point; we consider this a translation error and follow the English version. A side note in the guidance concerns liability: for the purposes of product liability law, computer code as such is not a product, so manufacturers placing it on the market cannot be held liable under the Product Liability Directive (EU) 2024/2853. This does not rule out liability under national tort law.

04Chapter 4

Hardware with companion software, data connection, complex systems

For connected devices, it is the function, not the distribution channel, that determines what belongs to the product: drivers and companion apps without which a device cannot fulfil its purpose are part of it. Whether a device is covered at all depends on the data connection, not on the electronics. And complex systems with long life cycles are not exempt, but can demonstrate their conformity on a risk basis.

Companion software belongs to the device

According to the guidance, whether software forms part of a product with digital elements is determined not by how or when it is delivered. What matters is whether, in light of the intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable use, it is necessary for the product to perform its intended functions. Where a hardware product is designed to work together with a specific software from the same manufacturer, the two together constitute the product. Software that is necessary to operate, configure, control or use the product in accordance with its intended purpose is part of it — even if it is only obtained after the hardware has been placed on the market, via an app store, a download link or another digital channel. It is placed on the market at the same point in time as the hardware units; the timing rules for standalone software from Chapter 2 do not apply here.

Example 8: network printer

The printer is placed on the market as a hardware product, while the drivers for sending print jobs, configuring the device and managing its operation are available for download from the manufacturer’s website. Although they are supplied through different channels, the printer and the drivers form a single product: without the drivers, the printer cannot fulfil its intended purpose.

Example 9: fitness wearable

The wearable measures heart rate and activity. Measurements, history and configuration are available only via the manufacturer’s smartphone app, which is downloaded separately from the app store. The wearable and the app are designed and intended to operate together — and are therefore a single product.

Our assessment: for many manufacturers, this shifts the product boundary. App releases, driver updates and configuration tools are often created by different teams and in different release cycles from the firmware. For the purposes of the Regulation, they belong to the same product, with a joint risk assessment, technical documentation and conformity assessment. The case expressly addressed is software from the same manufacturer; the guidance does not expressly say whether necessary software from a third party is included. That remains a matter for case-by-case assessment.

Data connection: digital information rather than mere electronics

The Regulation applies to products whose intended purpose or reasonably foreseeable use includes a direct or indirect logical or physical data connection to a device or network. The guidance emphasises that the scope is anchored not in the mere presence of electronics, but in the capacity to exchange digital information. Because the Regulation does not define “data connection” or “digital data”, the Commission interprets the term. The aim is to distinguish products that merely use electrical signals from those that participate in digital communication and are therefore exposed to cybersecurity risks.

  1. Is information transmitted in binary form?

    At its most basic level, a data connection involves transmitting information as a sequence of 0s and 1s.

  2. Are the states deliberately encoded as information?

    There must be a sender that deliberately generates digital symbols according to a defined scheme. Simply switching an output on and off does not by itself constitute a data connection if those states are not intended to represent data or are not read by a digital input.

  3. Can the receiver interpret them as data?

    At the destination, a receiver must be capable of decoding the symbols as information.

  4. Are the signals used solely to trigger or power a function?

    Where electrical or electronic signals are used solely for this purpose, without conveying digitally encoded information, no data connection exists. To that extent, the product does not fall within the scope.

  5. Is the connection part of the intended purpose?

    If a data connection exists, it remains to be checked whether it forms part of the intended purpose or reasonably foreseeable use — direct or indirect, logical or physical, to a device or network.

The criteria are taken from the guidance; the order of the steps is our own structuring. For borderline cases, you should document the outcome together with the reasoning.

Complex systems: not exempt, but risk-based

Products with digital elements can also be complex systems made up of multiple hardware and software elements operating together. Where such a system is placed on the market as a single product, it is a product within the meaning of the Regulation. The guidance describes typical characteristics: long design and development cycles, contracts that may have been signed before the date of application, particularly long operational lifetimes, a high degree of technical and organisational complexity, components placed on the market before the date of application, established architectures and widely used interoperability standards. Certain technical characteristics may then be difficult or disproportionate to modify without affecting the intended purpose, safety, reliability or interoperability with existing infrastructure.

These characteristics do not exclude such systems from the scope. According to the guidance, they illustrate the Regulation’s risk-based approach, which allows compliance to be demonstrated in different ways. Where certain essential requirements are not applicable or cannot be fulfilled with state-of-the-art measures — for instance because the system must interact with existing dependencies or meet interoperability requirements — manufacturers should identify and document these constraints, assess the risks and implement alternative or compensatory risk-mitigation measures. The technical documentation and the user information describe the constraints, risks and measures transparently. During the support period, manufacturers must periodically reassess whether the constraints continue to exist; where they can be lifted or reduced, the product should be updated. According to the guidance, this logic may apply, as appropriate, to all products, not just complex systems.

ExampleSituationCommission’s expectation
Example 10: legacy protocolThe risk assessment requires a secure communication protocol, but the intended purpose includes interoperability with existing systems that only support an older, less secure protocol.The less secure protocol is permissible insofar as it is necessary for interoperability and its risks are identified and mitigated by other means. Where supporting both is technically feasible, the secure protocol is implemented and used by default.
Example 11: legacy componentA manufacturer of industrial automation systems purchased microcontrollers before the date of application; the system is to be placed on the market afterwards. The risk assessment identifies no specific risks for one of these microcontrollers.The manufacturer integrates it and ensures that the system as a whole meets the essential requirements.
05Chapter 5

Legacy designs: products designed before the date of application on 11 December 2027

Many products placed on the market from 11 December 2027 onwards were designed years earlier. The guidance clarifies that the Regulation does not automatically require them to be redesigned: the risk assessment decides. Conformity assessment, the EU declaration of conformity, CE marking and vulnerability handling nevertheless remain mandatory.

New units of an old type

From 11 December 2027, the Regulation applies in full. After that date, many manufacturers will place on the market units manufactured in accordance with a type or model designed and developed before that date. Because placing on the market refers to each individual product (Chapter 2), the obligations of the Regulation apply to these units as to any other product. The guidance answers the question of what this means for the design: compliance with the Regulation does not necessarily require these units to be redesigned.

Terminology trap in the official German language version: in this section, it refers to the Regulation’s “Inkrafttreten” (entry into force) on 11 December 2027. What is meant is the date of application; the Regulation already entered into force on 10 December 2024. We therefore use “date of application” throughout.

The risk assessment decides

The manufacturer must carry out a cybersecurity risk assessment. On the basis of the intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable use, this assessment determines which essential cybersecurity requirements are applicable to the product and how they are implemented. Where the assessment shows that the product already incorporates appropriate and effective security measures addressing the relevant risks, the manufacturer may rely on those measures to demonstrate compliance. The Regulation does not in itself impose an obligation to introduce new security features or to redesign the product where this is not necessary to address the identified risks. Conversely, in our reading, this means that if the assessment reveals gaps, new measures are needed to the extent that the risks require them.

Where the manufacturer cannot demonstrate how the risk assessment was taken into account during the original design and development phase, the guidance states that the obligation is to be understood as follows: the manufacturer carries out the assessment now and demonstrates on that basis that the product incorporates adequate security measures with a view to minimising cybersecurity risks, preventing incidents and minimising their impact — including in relation to the health and safety of users. Where the risk assessment and technical documentation demonstrate an appropriate level of cybersecurity and compliance with the essential requirements, the product can be placed on the market without redesign.

Proportionate evidence, obligations in full

The manufacturer demonstrates conformity through the relevant conformity assessment procedure and includes the evidence in the technical documentation. The guidance interprets this obligation in light of the risk assessment. For legacy designs subject to the procedures of the so-called “default” category, i.e. without a core functionality of a category of important or critical products (Chapter 9), no test results from the original design and development phase should be required where the risk assessment already demonstrates appropriate and effective measures. Such evidence would not increase the security of the product. Where tests are nonetheless necessary, evidence is not expected for every product variant; the tests can be grouped across product families.

All other obligations remain, regardless of whether the design had to be modified. Before the product is placed on the market, the applicable conformity assessment procedure must have been carried out, the EU declaration of conformity drawn up and the CE marking affixed. The manufacturer should provide evidence of how it meets the vulnerability handling requirements, keep the risk assessment up to date and provide users with the required information and instructions.

Example 12 of the guidance: a microcontroller from before the date of application

  1. Starting point

    A microcontroller designed and developed before the date of application is intended to be integrated into a range of electronic products, including products with connectivity functionalities. New units are to be placed on the market after the date of application.

  2. Risk assessment

    Beforehand, the manufacturer assesses the cybersecurity risks on the basis of the intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable use. Among other things, it identifies unauthorised access, manipulation of software or data, and misuse of available interfaces.

  3. Outcome

    The original design already incorporates appropriate and effective measures against these risks. The manufacturer concludes that the relevant essential requirements are met; no redesign or additional security functionalities are necessary.

  4. Evidence

    Where an earlier risk assessment cannot be evidenced, the manufacturer documents a current assessment and explains how the design and measures mitigate the risks. It is not required to recreate historical design or test documentation. For variants with the same design and the same risk profile, representative evidence for the product family is sufficient.

  5. Ongoing obligations

    The manufacturer maintains processes to address and remediate vulnerabilities and keeps the risk assessment under continuous review.

  6. Placing on the market without redesign

    In these circumstances, the microcontroller may be placed on the market without redesign, provided that the risk assessment and technical documentation demonstrate an appropriate level of cybersecurity and the applicable essential requirements are met.

Legacy design, existing product, legacy component

ScenarioWhat appliesChapter
Legacy design: type designed before 11 December 2027, unit placed on the market afterwardsAll manufacturer obligations for the unit; redesign only to the extent that the risk assessment requires it5
Existing product: unit placed on the market before 11 December 2027The law applicable at the time of placing on the market is decisive, as long as no substantial modification takes place on or after 11 December 2027; the reporting obligations have nevertheless applied since 11 September 20267 and 12
Legacy component: procured before the date of application, integrated into a product placed on the market afterwardsPart of the risk assessment of the overall product; the product as a whole must meet the essential requirements (Example 11)4

The overview summarises statements from several sections of the guidance; the terms legacy design, existing product and legacy component are our own.

06Chapter 6

Free and open-source software: responsibility, monetisation, stewards

Open source is neither exempt across the board nor covered across the board. The guidance proceeds step by step: is it free and open-source software within the meaning of the Regulation, who bears responsibility, and is it placed on the market in the course of a commercial activity? A legal person that is not a manufacturer can be an open-source software steward — with considerably lighter obligations.

The Regulation applies to products made available for the first time in the course of a commercial activity. According to the “Blue Guide”, whether a commercial activity exists can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis, for example taking into account the regularity of the supplies, the characteristics of the product and the intentions of the supplier. For free and open-source software, the Regulation sets its own guard rails: the circumstances of development and the way it is financed should play no role, and the provision of non-monetised free and open-source software is not considered a commercial activity. If such software is not placed on the market, it falls outside the scope — unless the entity publishing it is a legal person that meets the definition of an open-source software steward. In that case, the entity is subject only to the obligations of stewards.

The assessment sequence in eight steps

  1. Is it free and open-source software within the meaning of the Regulation?

    Two conditions must be met cumulatively: a licence granting all rights to make the software freely accessible, usable, modifiable and redistributable, and openly shared source code. Openly shared means publicly available, upstream or downstream. Software under a free licence whose source code is available only to paying customers or a limited group does not meet the definition. The guidance does not name specific licences.

  2. Is the software under your responsibility?Example 13

    Responsibility lies with whoever publishes it and exercises primary control over its development, releases and distribution decisions — in practice, the maintainers. Anyone who only contributes code and does not control releases, the roadmap or governance is a contributor; to that extent, the Regulation does not apply to them. Commit access alone does not establish responsibility. Anyone who submits a pull or merge request is likewise a contributor.

  3. Do you charge a price for the software itself?

    Charging a price, for example for pre-compiled binaries, constitutes placing on the market; whoever supplies software on that basis is a manufacturer. Where a paid or enhanced version exists alongside a free community version, including in the open-core model, these are different products: the monetised version is placed on the market, the community version is not. For the community version, a legal person is subject to the steward obligations; a natural person is subject to none.

  4. Do you monetise other services or data through the software?Examples 14–16

    This, too, constitutes placing on the market: where other products or services are monetised through the software, for example through advertising, commission fees, subscriptions or paid additional servers, or where use is conditional on the processing of personal data for purposes other than exclusively security, compatibility or interoperability.

  5. Is access tied to remuneration or donations?Examples 17–22

    Paid consultancy, training or installation assistance around freely available software does not in itself constitute placing on the market. The decisive factor is whether access to the software itself, including its maintenance, is conditional on remuneration, for example in the case of a paid edition with technical assistance. A donation link is not to be viewed as an intention to make a profit, even where donations exceed the costs. The situation is different where releases, binaries, updates or security fixes are de facto available only to donors, or where donations bring contractual benefits or exclusive advantages that go beyond community perks.

  6. Financing, not-for-profit status, integration by othersExamples 23–26

    Grants, bug bounty programmes, sponsorships or paid feature development do not turn openly shared software that is not otherwise monetised into a product placed on the market. Software published by not-for-profit entities whose earnings after costs are all used to achieve not-for-profit objectives is not considered placed on the market, even where it is directly monetised. The same applies to software intended for integration by other manufacturers that the publisher does not additionally monetise.

  7. Are you an open-source software steward?

    If the software is not placed on the market, a legal person checks whether it is a steward: this is the case where the software is intended for commercial activities, for example for integration into commercial services or monetised products, and the legal person systematically provides support on a sustained basis for its development and ensures its viability. Natural persons cannot be stewards; without placing on the market, they have no obligations under the Regulation.

  8. Do you integrate third-party free and open-source software?Examples 27–34

    In that case, all manufacturer obligations apply to your own product, including due diligence for each integrated component. You do not become responsible for the compliance of the component itself, not even through code contributions, developer time or funding.

The steps follow the stylised flowchart in the guidance and supplement it with criteria from the text; the order is our own structuring. The assessment is made per project, per version and per edition. For donations, the guidance requires an overall assessment of the circumstances.

Monetisation: the borderline cases

ScenarioExampleOutcome under the guidance
Free operating system, alongside a paid version with technical assistance and performance optimisation17The paid version is placed on the market
Freely downloadable command line tool, consultancy and training can be booked separately18Not placed on the market
Service provider installs third-party software at a customer’s site without substantially modifying it19No placing on the market by the service provider
Call for donations; access to software, source code and updates independent of donations20Not placed on the market
Downloadable releases and security updates only for donors21Placed on the market: the donation amounts to charging a price
Source code public; binaries, updates and guaranteed security fixes only for donors22Placed on the market
Manufacturer pays an individual developer for a feature that is openly shared23Not placed on the market; if the manufacturer integrates the software, its due diligence obligation applies
Not-for-profit publisher of a browser, monetised via search engine partnerships24Not placed on the market; the publisher is a steward

Paid enterprise versions under a commercial agreement are considered placed on the market, even where functionally equivalent software is available free of charge under a free licence. For natural persons, directly bundled technical assistance remains unproblematic as long as the price covers only the actual costs, including reasonable living expenses.

Open-source software stewards: obligations by type of support

With the open-source software steward, the Regulation has created a legal category of its own: a legal person, other than a manufacturer, that has the purpose or objective of systematically providing support on a sustained basis for the development of free and open-source software intended for commercial activities, and of ensuring the viability of that software. Typical forms of sustained support are hosting and managing collaboration platforms, hosting source code or software, governing or managing the software and steering its development. The status applies per project: the same legal person can be a steward for one project and a manufacturer for another, a steward for the community version and a manufacturer for the paid version of the same software. Foundations are stewards only for those projects that they systematically support and that are intended for commercial activities.

Type of supportTypical activitiesReporting and information obligations under the guidance
Non-technical onlyBranding, governance rules, community events, collecting donationsNo obligation to report actively exploited vulnerabilities or severe incidents. If the steward becomes aware of an actively exploited vulnerability, it should share the information with the maintainers in accordance with its cybersecurity policy; voluntary reporting should be considered.
IT infrastructureHosting source code repositories, version control systems, generating signing keysNotify ENISA and the CSIRTs of severe incidents related to this infrastructure that have an impact on the security of products; where appropriate, inform all users, for example via a general announcement. No obligation to report actively exploited vulnerabilities, but voluntary reporting should be considered.
Engineering resourcesEmploying developers, coordinating development, reviewing and merging code, managing releases, handling vulnerability reports and security patchesReport actively exploited vulnerabilities of which the steward becomes aware and, where appropriate, inform all users; where there is a direct relationship with impacted users, inform them directly.

All stewards must comply with the Regulation’s general steward obligations; how far the reporting and information obligations extend depends on the type of support.

Where stewards must report actively exploited vulnerabilities, the guidance states that the obligation arises as soon as active exploitation is detected — not merely because a vulnerability exists in the codebase — and only to the extent that the steward is involved in development. In practice, the steward is likely to learn of this through reports from third parties, such as manufacturers, users or security researchers (Chapter 12). The status can change: where an entity ceases to provide systematic support on a sustained basis for a specific piece of software, it may no longer meet the definition; the guidance encourages it to communicate the change in status clearly. If a steward begins to monetise the project directly, it places it on the market and is a manufacturer from that point on — not retroactively for the versions it supported as a steward.

Integration by other manufacturers

For manufacturers that build free and open-source components into their products, three statements are central. First, whether the Regulation applies to a component depends solely on whether its publisher places it on the market; integration into a commercial product does not change its status, and maintainers of components not placed on the market have no obligations towards integrators. Second, whoever integrates a component does not become responsible for that individual component’s compliance — not even by contributing code to its maintenance. Third, all manufacturer obligations apply to the integrator’s own product: due diligence when integrating each component, and the obligation to report vulnerabilities in integrated components upstream and to share security patches. The scenarios in Examples 27 to 34, which the guidance describes as purely hypothetical, play this through.

Individual developer with a donation link (Examples 27 and 34)

Software openly shared, no price charged, voluntary donations, including from companies that integrate it; in Example 34, the library is published on a public package repository. Not placed on the market: the developer has no obligations under the Regulation, and in the scenario of Example 34 neither does the package repository. The integrating manufacturers bear their due diligence obligation.

Not-for-profit foundation or entity (Examples 28, 32, 33)

Component or software development kit for integration into commercial products, supported on a sustained basis and financed through public funding, donations, partnership projects or membership fees. The entity is the steward. Contributing manufacturers and members do not become manufacturers of the component and are not responsible for its compliance.

Company without monetisation (Examples 29 and 31)

A company publishes a component under its own name and maintains it so that others can integrate it, without charging a price and without any other form of monetisation. It is a steward, not a manufacturer. Anyone who only contributes code and developer time and offers support independently has no obligations for this software.

Company with a paid version (Example 30)

A company offers its software as a paid version with technical assistance or performance optimisation; other companies contribute, but control remains with the publisher. The publisher is a manufacturer; as a not-for-profit entity, it would be a steward. The contributors have no obligations for this software; if they integrate it, their due diligence obligation applies.

07Chapter 7

Substantial modification: repairs, spare parts, software updates

Whether a modification is substantial determines whether a new conformity assessment and a new placing on the market are required and, in some circumstances, whether there is a new manufacturer. The guidance measures this not by scale or effort, but by risk: new or increased risks not covered by the risk assessment, or a changed intended purpose, make a modification substantial. Repairs and security updates are generally not substantial modifications.

Definition and significance

Under the Regulation, a substantial modification is a change to the product following its placing on the market which affects compliance with the essential cybersecurity requirements or results in a modification to the intended purpose for which the product has been assessed. The concept determines obligations in four situations. Importers and distributors that substantially modify a product already placed on the market are considered manufacturers, as is any other person who substantially modifies a product and makes it available on the market. Anyone who, after 11 December 2027, substantially modifies a product placed on the market before that date and places it on the market is considered its manufacturer. And for products placed on the market after that date, the concept determines whether a later change requires a new conformity assessment procedure — particularly for iteratively developed software.

Repairs and spare parts

According to the recitals of the Regulation, refurbishment, maintenance and repair do not necessarily lead to a substantial modification, for instance where the intended purpose and functionalities are not changed and the level of risk remains unaffected; an upgrade by the manufacturer, by contrast, may affect design, intended purpose and compliance. The guidance requires a case-by-case assessment for physical modifications and states that such operations are generally not substantial modifications. Nor does replacing defective or worn parts with better-performing ones constitute a substantial modification per se. It only does so if the change in performance or in the way the product operates affects compliance with the essential requirements or changes the intended purpose in a way not covered by the risk assessment. In Example 35, a server manufacturer replaces defective RAM with better-performing RAM; the higher performance remains within the assessed use, and the server is not substantially modified.

For spare parts, the Regulation provides for an exemption: parts intended to replace identical components and manufactured according to the same specifications are not subject to it. The guidance draws two limits. First, the exemption applies only where the part is specifically supplied to repair or extend the durability of a product already placed on the market, whether that product was placed on the market before or after 11 December 2027. This must be apparent from the context of the supply, for example through identification of the product or product family in the order or commercial offer, or through supply via after-sales and service channels; supporting evidence should be kept available to the market surveillance authorities. The fact that a part technically fits is not sufficient. Second, whether a part is “identical” is measured by its functional role and the characteristics relevant to cybersecurity: differences that do not affect the security characteristics or the risk profile are not detrimental, whereas differences in algorithms, protocols, cryptographic mechanisms or access controls may rule out identity. The exemption also applies where a complete product that forms part of a larger product is replaced.

ExampleSpare partOutcome
36Identical communication module for connected controllers placed on the market in 2026, before the date of application, and in 2028, in compliance with the RegulationExemption applies in both cases; the repair is not a substantial modification
37Newer communication chip with a different cryptographic implementation and updated secure boot for an industrial controller from 2026Not identical: a product in its own right that must comply with the Regulation, assessed also with regard to interoperability with the legacy device
38Wireless module with a different chipset and updated firmware, but the same protocols and security mechanismsCan be considered identical; exemption applies
39Replacement CPU or complete replacement PLC for an automation system, supplied via the after-sales service channel with the target system identifiedExemption applies in both variants

If a spare part is not identical, it is a product in its own right. Where individual essential requirements cannot be met because of its intended purpose or technical constraints, the same applies as for complex systems: reflect this in the risk assessment, implement alternative or compensatory measures and document them transparently (Chapter 4). This does not in itself make the repair of the main product a substantial modification.

Software updates: risk, not scale

The guidance devotes the most space to software updates. The starting point is the recitals of the Regulation: a product is substantially modified where a change alters the level of cybersecurity risk and this altered or additional risk was not considered in the risk assessment and, consequently, in the implementation of the essential requirements. From this, the Commission derives a case-by-case assessment for each update. New functionalities that change the intended purpose of the product as a whole are generally substantial. Progressively introduced functionalities that the risk assessment has already anticipated and assessed, or that do not, in themselves, alter the risk profile, are not. Conversely, even small functionalities can introduce significant risks: the yardstick is not the scale or complexity of the change, but its potential adverse impact on the risk profile. Security updates are generally not substantial, even where they introduce significant technical changes or constrain functionalities solely to mitigate vulnerabilities — unless they change the intended purpose or introduce new risks, for example by materially changing the product’s boundaries or dependencies.

UpdateExampleSubstantial?Why
Dashboard can now control machines instead of merely displaying data40YesIntended purpose shifts from situational awareness to operational control, not envisaged in the risk assessment
Consumer app generates behavioural profiles and makes automated decisions about content41YesThe user-controlled tool becomes an automated decision-making system
Group chat in a messaging app, foreseen in the design and the risk assessment42NoRemains within the assessed intended purpose
Activation of already built-in, assessed control loops, including safeguards43NoImplemented as assessed
“Remember me” function with locally stored tokens44YesDespite its limited scope, new risks not assessed, such as token theft and session hijacking
Export of detailed system logs, stored unencrypted45YesRisks of data exposure that were neither assessed nor mitigated
Patch against a buffer overflow or authentication bypass46NoOnly the internal implementation changes; the update serves exclusively to reduce risk
Hardening: stricter firewall rules, closing unused ports, password policies, mandatory MFA where foreseen47NoPurpose unchanged, even if users configure or access the product differently
Disabling a deprecated algorithm, activating a stronger, already supported alternative48NoForeseen and assessed, without new external dependencies or altered data flows
Local encryption replaced by mandatory upload to a remote encryption service49YesIntended purpose fundamentally altered, although security-driven
Key management switched to an external service operated by a third party50YesNew dependencies, data flows and external interfaces, not assessed

Summary of Examples 40 to 50 of the guidance. The outcomes illustrate the Commission’s interpretation and do not replace a case-by-case assessment.

Four questions for every update — non-exhaustive

  1. New threat vectors?

    Additional interfaces, communication channels, execution environments or external dependencies.

  2. New attack scenarios?

    New ways in which unauthorised access, manipulation, interference or misuse of the product, or of the data it processes, could occur.

  3. Changed likelihood of known attacks?

    Less effort or expertise required to carry them out, greater exposure to untrusted actors, weakened safeguards.

  4. Changed impact of known attacks?

    More data or functions affected, more severe operational, safety or economic consequences, reduced ability to detect, contain and recover from an incident.

  5. Outcome

    If none of the questions applies and the assumptions and mitigation measures of the risk assessment remain valid and effective, the update is likely not a substantial modification. If one applies, the manufacturer reassesses the risks and checks whether the essential requirements continue to be met and whether new or increased risks arise that were not foreseen.

  6. Always, regardless of the outcome

    During the support period, manufacturers remain responsible for the security of their updates and of the product in accordance with the vulnerability handling requirements. The risk assessment and technical documentation must be kept accurate, complete and continuously up to date, including for updates that are not a substantial modification.

Consequences: new product, new manufacturer?

If a substantially modified product is made available on the market, it is a new product for the purposes of the Regulation; making it available constitutes a new placing on the market, regardless of who carried out the modification. If the original manufacturer makes the modification, including in the course of iterative software development, it remains the manufacturer. It may reuse existing documentation and test results for parts not affected, and the conformity assessment procedure should focus on the substantially modified parts — as should the conformity assessment body in the case of a third-party assessment. By contrast, anyone who substantially modifies another manufacturer’s product and makes it available changes role.

Who modifies?Role afterwardsScope of obligations
Original manufacturerRemains the manufacturer; the modified product is considered newly placed on the marketConformity assessment focusing on the modified parts; reuse documentation and tests for unchanged parts
Importer, distributor or other person making the modified product availableConsidered the manufacturer of the modified product, even without involvement in the design or the original placing on the marketManufacturer obligations, including conformity assessment and reporting obligations, only for the modified part, as long as the cybersecurity of the product as a whole is not negatively affected; otherwise for the entire product
Integrator assembling components into a product of its ownManufacturer of a new product; not a substantial modification of another manufacturer’s productThe Regulation applies in full to the product as a whole; the integrator may rely on the compliance activities of the component manufacturers (Example 51)
Original manufacturer of a product placed on the market before 11 December 2027Remains the manufacturerOnly the substantially modified parts, unless the modification negatively affects the cybersecurity of the product as a whole

Where a third party makes the modification, the original manufacturer’s obligations continue to apply to the unchanged original product. According to the “Blue Guide” cited in the guidance, whoever makes the modification must demonstrate that not all parts of the technical documentation need to be updated, and draws up their own declaration of conformity.

08Chapter 8

Support period: expected use time instead of a blanket five years

As a manufacturer, you decide yourself how long you handle a product’s vulnerabilities — but not at will. The guidance anchors the support period in the expected use time, reads the Regulation’s five years as a minimum and clarifies what new versions and substantial modifications change about the period. The reporting obligations do not end with it.

The Regulation requires every manufacturer to determine a support period. During this period, vulnerabilities of the product, expressly including its components, must be handled effectively and in accordance with the vulnerability handling requirements. The period is therefore the framework for your entire vulnerability management on the market: for security updates, for effective and regular tests and for the disclosure of fixed vulnerabilities. Because the Regulation expressly calls for guidance on this concept, the Commission devotes a separate section to it.

The yardstick: expected use time

The support period is meant to reflect how long the product is expected to be in use. To this end, the Regulation names in particular reasonable user expectations, the nature of the product, including its intended purpose, and relevant Union law determining the lifetime of products. The guidance lists further criteria that you may take into account and requires all criteria to be applied proportionately. Our assessment: the period is a reasoned manufacturer decision, not a marketing claim — and the reasoning should be documented in such a way that a market surveillance authority can follow it.

User expectations

How long can buyers reasonably expect to use the product securely? For a programmable logic controller, the answer differs from that for a short-lived consumer app.

Nature of the product and intended purpose

Durability, wear and the deployment environment shape the use time. The examples in the guidance repeatedly rely on the physical durability of the hardware.

Union law on lifetime

Where other Union legislation determines a lifetime for your product, that lifetime feeds into the determination of the support period.

Further criteria

Support periods of comparable products from other manufacturers, the availability of the operating environment, the support periods of components sourced from third parties that provide core functions, and relevant guidance from the administrative cooperation group (ADCO) and the Commission.

Five years is a minimum, not a default

The Regulation prescribes at least five years. The period may only be shorter if the product is expected to be in use for less than five years; it then corresponds to the expected use time. The guidance expressly describes this minimum duration as a safeguard: it is intended to ensure that vulnerabilities are handled for a sufficiently long period, while leaving room for products with genuinely shorter use. Where use for more than five years can reasonably be expected, support periods should be correspondingly longer. The Commission therefore clarifies that five years is not to be regarded as the default for all products. For you, this means: a period of less than five years requires evidence of the shorter use; where longer use is expected, a blanket five-year statement is not sufficient.

State the end date, notify the expiry

The Regulation requires transparency. At the time of purchase, the end date of the support period must be indicated in a clear and understandable manner, at least the month and year. At the end of the period, manufacturers must display a notification to users, where this is technically feasible in light of the nature of the product. According to the guidance, this is so that users know how long they can expect security support. VamiSec recommends showing the end date where the purchasing decision is made — on the product page, in the shop, in the quotation or in the contract — and feeding it from the same source as the technical documentation.

Software: every substantially modified version needs its own period

Software is often developed iteratively. The guidance therefore requires each substantially modified version to have a declared support period that complies with the Regulation’s criteria — including the five years, unless the use time of that version is demonstrably shorter. Where a substantial modification leaves the factors determining the use time unchanged, however, the remaining period applies; more on this below. At the same time, the Regulation offers flexibility: you may limit the remediation of vulnerabilities to the version last placed on the market if users of earlier versions have access to that version free of charge and do not incur additional costs to adjust their hardware and software environment. The Commission interprets “additional costs” in practical terms. Personnel time, routine testing, configuration adjustments or updating dependencies that have reached the end of their life do not count. Mandatory purchases of new hardware, infrastructure replacement or fundamental changes to the operating environment, by contrast, do.

Example 52 of the guidance illustrates this for a smartphone whose operating system can be updated to substantially modified versions free of charge and without new hardware. Example 53 concerns enterprise software released in a substantially modified version every few months. In both cases, the manufacturer may discontinue remediation for older versions as soon as an upgrade is possible, even if this shortens their effective support period. The other obligations continue to apply, such as the policy on coordinated vulnerability disclosure and the measures for sharing information about potential vulnerabilities, as do the reporting obligations. Users who have not upgraded should be informed, where technically feasible. If a free upgrade is possible, the Regulation does not oblige you to keep supporting older versions free of charge; you may, however, do so, including for a fee.

Substantial modification: reassessment, not a reset

If a product is substantially modified and made available again, it is treated as a new product with a new placing on the market. In the Commission’s view, the consequence for the support period is a reassessment against the same criteria, but neither an automatic reset nor an automatic extension. One question is decisive: does the modification affect the factors that originally determined the expected use time? If not, the period corresponds to the remaining original use time, even if less than five years remain. If it does, you recalculate it, for example after revitalising hardware modifications that extend the lifetime, or after a substantial reprogramming or rewrite of the core software.

ExampleSubstantial modificationDoes it affect the use-time factors?Consequence for the support period
Example 54: robot vacuum cleanerSoftware update adding new cleaning modes and navigation featuresNo: hardware durability and user expectations remain the sameRemaining expected use time as originally determined
Example 55: industrial machine with a cloud back-endRearchitecting the back-end, i.e. the remote data processing solution, with new APIs and data flowsNo: the nature of the product and user expectations remain the sameRemaining expected use time as originally determined
Example 56: programmable logic controllerReplacement of the embedded computing platform, including processor, memory and runtime environment, with a longer-lasting generationYes: users may now expect a longer period of productive useRecalculation based on the longer expected use time

In these examples, the guidance does not state any numbers of years but works with placeholders such as “X years”. According to the guidance, repair, maintenance and refurbishment are generally not considered substantial modifications.

09Chapter 9

Important and critical products: the core functionality determines the procedure

Whether a product counts as a default product, an important product of class I or II or a critical product determines its route through conformity assessment. To this end, the guidance gives practical shape to a concept that the Regulation does not define: core functionality. It is determined objectively, there is exactly one, and integrated components do not shift it.

The Regulation contains two lists: important products, divided into classes I and II, and critical products. A product belongs to a category if it has that category’s core functionality; the technical description of the categories is set out in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392. For all other products, the guidance uses the term “default category”, a working term of the Commission that the Regulation itself does not use. The classification has consequences: it determines the conformity assessment procedure that must be completed before the product is placed on the market. Under the Regulation, breaches of the conformity assessment obligations can be sanctioned with administrative fines.

What core functionality is

The Commission understands core functionality as the main features and technical capabilities without which a product would not be able to meet its intended purpose. It is assessed in the specific context and under the conditions of use, based on, among other things, the instructions for use, promotional and sales materials, statements by the manufacturer and the technical documentation. What counts is the objective finding: how a product is described or marketed does not matter if the description does not reflect its actual technical characteristics. The guidance expressly prohibits presenting the core functionality, by overemphasising or downplaying individual functions, in such a way that the more stringent procedure is circumvented. Clear inconsistencies between promotional materials, instructions for use and technical documentation are a warning sign.

For the purpose of determining the procedure, a product has no more than one core functionality. It should be clearly identified in the technical documentation so that the applicable procedure is established and market surveillance authorities can check its application. Additional functions do not rule out a category: if they merely complement or enhance a core functionality that corresponds to a category, the classification stands. Modules that you supply solely as part of an integrated product are not classified individually; the core functionality is then determined at the level of the product as a whole.

Five cases on core functionality

ExampleProductOutcome according to the guidanceWhat follows from it
Example 57Software that, as an abstraction layer over the hardware, manages processes, memory, input and output as well as resources and provides system interfacesCore functionality of an operating system within the meaning of the category descriptionThe technical documentation and the manufacturer’s statements support the classification
Example 58Smartphone with an integrated operating systemNo operating system core functionality; the smartphone as a whole serves communication and access to information and servicesThe mere integration of an important or critical product does not in itself make the end product important or critical
Example 59SOAR software that can also perform SIEM functionsGenerally no SIEM core functionality, because it substantially exceeds it, for example with incident responseA product that can perform a category’s functions does not automatically belong to it
Example 60Log collection and visualisation tool with basic dashboardsGenerally no SIEM core functionality, because data correlation and actionable security insights are missingA product that falls substantially short of a category does not belong to it either
Example 61Security suite with SIEM, intrusion detection and analytics modules, the modules also available as separate subscriptionsSIEM module class I, intrusion detection system class II, analytics module defaultSeparately offered modules are standalone products with their own core functionality

Which procedure for which class

ClassificationConformity assessmentThird-party involvement
DefaultThe internal control procedure based on module A (“self-assessment”) is always possible; you may voluntarily choose a more stringent procedureNot required
Important, class IModule A only if you have fully applied a relevant harmonised standard and its scope covers at least all cybersecurity risks of the core functionality; the same applies to common specifications and European certification schemes at assurance level at least “substantial”Required if these bases have not been applied or have been applied only in part
Important, class IIModule B+C, module H or a cybersecurity certification schemeAlways required
CriticalModule B+C, module H or a cybersecurity certification schemeAlways required

Exception under the Regulation: manufacturers of important products of classes I and II placed on the market as free and open-source software may follow the procedures of the default category; the Regulation makes this conditional on the technical documentation being publicly available at the time of placing on the market. According to the guidance, a European certification scheme at assurance level at least “substantial” counts as third-party involvement because a third-party certification body is involved.

For class I, the Commission sets out two cumulative conditions for the internal control procedure: all applicable requirements of a relevant harmonised standard have been applied, and the standard’s scope covers at least all cybersecurity risks of the core functionality. If your product goes beyond the scope of the standard, module A remains possible. You must then, however, demonstrate that the remaining risks are also addressed and document the additional measures; the risk assessment is mandatory in any case. Example 62 of the guidance shows this for antivirus software with additional disk-cleaning and anti-tracking functions, Example 63 for a router with an integrated firewall component. There, the manufacturer may additionally apply the harmonised standard for firewalls to the firewall functionality. In both cases, the internal control procedure is permissible for the product as a whole — according to the guidance, even where a product with the core functionality of a class I product contains a component that would in itself be a critical product.

For class II, apart from the open-source exception, and for critical products, this route does not exist; a third party is always involved. The Regulation also allows the Commission to make European cybersecurity certification mandatory for critical products. The guidance does not address any such determination.

Presumption of conformity only for covered risks

If you apply a harmonised standard whose reference has been published in the Official Journal, you benefit from the presumption of conformity — but only for the risks and essential cybersecurity requirements covered by that standard. It can apply to the product as a whole, for example, where the standard covers all risks of the core functionality and no additional function brings its own uncovered risks. The Commission expects, for instance, that the harmonised standard for routers will cover at least the risks of the router core functionality. Example 64 of the guidance: antivirus software may be assessed under the internal control procedure, but the presumption applies only to the core functionality, not to disk cleaning and anti-tracking. Example 65: if the standard is extended to cover disk cleaning, the presumption extends to it; the anti-tracking function remains outside. Irrespective of this, you bear full responsibility for assessing all risks of your product.

For context: Examples 62 to 65 presuppose harmonised standards whose references have been published in the Official Journal. Whether a class I product can use the internal control procedure therefore depends on whether such a standard or an equivalent basis exists for its category. Our recommendation: plan for both routes — module A once references of harmonised standards have been published in the Official Journal, and third-party conformity assessment for as long as this is not the case.

10Chapter 10

Risk assessment, components and product families: the product is the yardstick

Section 7 of the guidance sharpens the obligation with which everything begins: the cybersecurity risk assessment. The Commission measures residual risks not against your risk appetite but against the appropriate level of cybersecurity of the product, and responsibility cannot be handed off by means of a warning notice. A separate due diligence obligation applies to components sourced from third parties, and pragmatic reuse of documentation applies to product families.

The Regulation establishes two distinct but complementary obligations. First, manufacturers assess the cybersecurity risks of the product itself: they identify relevant risks, assess their potential impact and implement appropriate measures in line with the essential cybersecurity requirements. Second, a due diligence obligation applies to integrated components. Together, the two are intended to ensure that the product remains secure, including where it relies on remote data processing solutions, remote services or third-party software and hardware components.

Residual risk: the yardstick is the product, not your risk appetite

In organisational risk management, decisions are based on acceptance criteria derived from corporate objectives or risk appetite. The guidance deliberately sets a different yardstick: residual risk is to be measured by whether the product ensures an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks, taking into account its intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable use. In the Commission’s view, internal risk tolerance, commercial strategy or mere cost considerations are not relevant to this. The assessment must take into account the conditions of use, including the operational environment and the intended users, the assets to be protected and the expected use time. The Commission recognises that residual risks cannot be entirely eliminated. This does not, however, imply any discretion to accept arbitrary risks: a product may only be placed on the market once the residual risks have been sufficiently addressed through the implementation of the essential requirements. Where risks cannot be adequately addressed, changes to the design, functionality or intended purpose may become necessary; cost or commercial feasibility alone does not justify leaving them untreated.

Address risks instead of shifting them

The Regulation requires manufacturers to address identified risks through appropriate measures, including at product level. The guidance gives as examples a reduced attack surface, technical safeguards, limited or adapted functionality and a more precisely defined intended purpose. Foreseeable use can also be shaped, through risk communication, user guidance or a user interface that steers towards secure use patterns. The guidance draws a clear line: the Regulation does not provide for the transfer of cybersecurity risks or responsibility to users or third parties to compensate for design shortcomings. Information and instructions may support secure deployment and inform users about residual risks, in a manner appropriate to the type of product and its intended users.

Two examples show the latitude. In Example 66 of the guidance, a manufacturer refrains from protecting an industrial sensor against physical attacks because such protection would impair its functionality. Instead, it restricts the intended purpose to trusted environments without unauthorised physical access and informs users clearly about this restriction. In Example 67, a professional application stores sensitive data locally; rather than developing its own encryption, the manufacturer relies on the mature and regularly maintained encryption and key management functions of the operating system. Our reading: both examples show risk-based decisions, not carte blanche. In the first case, it is the more precisely defined intended purpose that carries the weight, not the notice alone.

Secure design and external dependencies

The first essential cybersecurity requirement requires products to be designed, developed and produced in such a way that they ensure an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks; in practice, this is often called “security by design”. The guidance reads it as a catch-all requirement for all identified risks, in particular those not covered by the other essential requirements. Where all relevant risks are addressed through these other requirements, it is deemed fulfilled, which the Commission expects to be the case in most instances. Where additional risks remain, you need additional measures on the product.

The risk assessment also covers risks that originate outside the product, for example in external networks, third-party infrastructure or other systems. The Regulation does not require you to govern this environment, but it does require you to mitigate its risks through the design of the product. The guidance gives examples: against back-end systems that are not part of the product and could be misused to send malicious commands, cryptographic authentication of remote commands, integrity checks of configuration changes and security-relevant logs or alerts in the event of abnormal behaviour can help. If an external service fails, for example due to power or infrastructure outages, the product must not enter an insecure state. The Regulation does not regulate how the back-end infrastructure is organised, staffed or operated.

Due diligence for third-party components

  1. Derive needs from the risk assessment

    Determine what the product requires from a component to meet its cybersecurity objectives, such as cryptographic functions, update mechanisms or secure communications. According to the guidance, this is the only way to fulfil the due diligence obligation.

  2. Verify in a risk-based manner

    Check whether the component meets these needs. As evidence, the guidance cites documentation from the component manufacturer such as technical specifications, security documentation, or conformity documentation and other assurance documentation; where appropriate, your own tests supplement this.

  3. Treat as an externally supplied component

    Components sourced from third parties and physically or logically integrated belong in the risk assessment. For compliance purposes, you treat them as externally supplied components whose properties you verify upon integration, because you have generally not designed them yourself.

  4. Feed the outcome into the demonstration of conformity

    Due diligence is a separate legal obligation, but it underpins the demonstration that the product as a whole meets the essential requirements. Your own functionalities implement the requirements directly; third-party components are integrated with due diligence.

This expressly also applies to free and open-source components: in its open-source scenarios, the guidance repeatedly states that manufacturers integrating such components must fulfil their due diligence obligation, even if the component itself has not been placed on the market. The guidance does not use the term software bill of materials (SBOM); the Regulation itself requires, as part of vulnerability handling, that components be identified and documented, including by means of a software bill of materials. Our recommendation: bring the bill of materials, component requirements and due diligence evidence together in a single register so that procurement, development and product security work with the same data.

Product families: assess once, reflect the differences

Variants, models or configurations of the same product family do not each have to be treated as an entirely separate product if they share the same architecture, the same security-relevant design and the same intended purpose and are exposed to the same cybersecurity risks. Provided that all variants are adequately covered, the guidance considers a single risk assessment, a single set of technical documentation and a single conformity assessment procedure sufficient. A single EU declaration of conformity is also possible if it clearly identifies the variants covered. You remain responsible, however, for ensuring that the documentation accurately reflects the products actually placed on the market.

Difference between variantsSecurity-relevant?Consequence
Colour, form factor, memory sizeNoNo separate risk or conformity assessment required
Communication interfaces, software stacksYesReflect in the risk assessment and, where necessary, also in the conformity assessment and technical documentation
Update mechanisms, remote connectivityYesLikewise; a single conformity assessment can only be relied on to the extent that the cybersecurity properties do not differ
New variant with new risks or a changed implementation of the requirementsYesUpdate the existing risk assessment and conformity documentation
11Chapter 11

Remote data processing: the test and five use cases

Under the Regulation, a product with digital elements also includes its remote data processing solutions. The guidance translates the definition into a test with two cumulative questions and works through it using five fictional use cases. Who operates the back-end is irrelevant here; who designed and developed it is not.

The Regulation defines a product with digital elements as a software or hardware product including its remote data processing solutions. The risk assessment, the essential cybersecurity requirements and lifecycle obligations such as reporting actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents therefore extend to the associated remote processing. Only the software elements are meant; the hardware on which the processing runs is not part of the product. Nor is the manufacturer’s entire IT meant, but only the software that enables the execution of the solution in question.

The test

  1. Does the processing take place at a distance?

    Typically outside the user environment or an organisation’s operational environment, wired or wireless, in the cloud or close to the device at the edge. According to the guidance, this criterion is relevant but not sufficient and requires a case-by-case assessment by the manufacturer.

  2. Would the product lose one of its functions without it?

    This means any function, not only the core functionality or the intended purpose, and thus also functions that support the product’s overall performance. The guidance cites sending commands to a device, synchronising files, onboarding users, configuration, automated distribution of updates and identity and access management.

  3. Was the software designed and developed by the manufacturer or under its responsibility?

    Yes for in-house development and for development by a service provider based on your designs and specifications. No for merely licensing an existing product or service that a provider offers to all its customers, or slightly modified versions thereof.

  4. Outcome

    Both questions answered in the affirmative: a remote data processing solution and thus part of the product. Function question answered in the negative: not a remote data processing solution, but the risks of the processing belong in the risk assessment. Function question affirmative, development question negative: a third-party solution that you treat like a component, with an assessment of the integration risks, measures on the product and due diligence.

Two clarifications help with borderline cases. If a function can be triggered both remotely and manually — the guidance cites a light bulb switched via an app or a switch — the remote processing can nevertheless be a remote data processing solution. Websites only count if they enable or support a product function, such as an authentication portal that issues credentials or tokens required for operation. Product information or a redirect from the product is not sufficient.

Development counts, operation does not

According to the guidance, who operates the solution is not decisive for the classification. If a third party operates a solution that you designed and developed, you remain responsible. Nor do remote data processing solutions have to run in a third-party cloud: servers on your premises, on-premises and private cloud solutions can fall within the definition just as much as the public cloud. The guidance distinguishes between cloud models: your own software on a third party’s infrastructure (IaaS) and your own application, whether created in-house or acquired, on a third party’s platform (PaaS) can be remote data processing solutions. A fully developed third-party application (SaaS) that you can configure only to a limited extent is not. Where the hypervisor, the platform operating system or the SaaS application is integrated into the product in a security-relevant manner, you treat it like a third-party component, with diligence proportionate to the risk. The provider’s security functions under the shared responsibility model can help here.

What is not remote data processing

  • The manufacturer’s internal systems such as human resources, payroll and customer relationship management
  • Continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) pipelines and the distribution of security updates to edge locations
  • Auditing and testing systems for penetration testing, threat hunting and red teaming — even though effective and regular tests are themselves a requirement of the Regulation
  • Remote analysis of telemetry data collected purely for statistical purposes or future product development
  • Websites containing only product information or instructions, even if the product refers to them
  • Downstream back-end systems with which the product does not interact directly
  • Networks that serve only as a communication channel, such as cellular networks, ethernet cables, routers or Wi-Fi

Outside the definition does not mean outside the risk assessment. Even if remote processing does not support a product function, you must check whether it poses risks to the product and, where necessary, mitigate them at product level. Downstream back-end systems remain external dependencies. One borderline case deserves attention: the guidance cites the automated distribution of updates as a possible product function, but the distribution of security updates to edge locations as an internal system. Our reading: what matters is whether the product itself interacts with the service to perform one of its functions.

Five use cases from the guidance

CaseWould a function be lost without the processing?Designed and developed by the manufacturer?Outcome and consequence
Mobile banking application: banking interfaceYes: authentication, submission of instructions, return of statusYes, under the responsibility of the financial entityRemote data processing solution; include in the risk assessment and the essential requirements for the product as a whole
Mobile banking application: account management and ledgerAvailability needed, but no direct interaction with the appNot relevantNot a remote data processing solution, but an external dependency: strong authentication of back-end interfaces, integrity protection of transaction data, secure channels, verification of responses
Mobile banking application: support chat as SaaSYesNo: code, interface and operation lie with the third-party providerNot a remote data processing solution, treated like a third-party component: isolate the chat from core functions, control data flows, validate content, exercise due diligence
Smart thermostatYes: exchanging commands, storing preferencesYes, operated on third-party IaaSRemote data processing solution; document the solution and the IaaS dependency, including contract details, for example by requesting evidence that NIS 2 obligations have been met
E-readerYes: access to purchased e-booksNo: SaaS storage service that the provider makes available to all customersNot a remote data processing solution, treated like a component: secure authentication, encryption, integrity protection of communications, due diligence in selection and integration
Industrial robotYes: without the calculated position, no picking up of partsYes, own remote service on third-party IaaSRemote data processing solution; documentation including contract details, due diligence in selecting the IaaS provider
Cellular networkNo: the network is only a communication channelNot relevantNeither a remote data processing solution nor a third-party component; no due diligence obligation towards the network operator

The use cases in Section 8.3 of the guidance are fictional and archetypal. They illustrate the classification and do not replace a case-by-case assessment.

What to do for remote data processing solutions

  • Indicate in the technical documentation that the product has remote data processing solutions or relies on third-party remote solutions, and describe them. If a solution serves several products, it belongs in each product’s documentation; its description may be reused.
  • Draw the boundary precisely: the solution comprises the software modules responsible for the functionality and their interfaces with external services.
  • Extend the risk assessment to three sources: your own solution, the reliance on third-party remote solutions and the product environment, including the underlying hardware.
  • Use evidence that providers already have; the guidance lists, non-exhaustively, evidence relating to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 and to DORA, statements of conformity or certificates under a European certification scheme, and ISO/IEC 27017:2015 and ISO/IEC 27001:2022.
  • Embed security guarantees in service level agreements, including an assurance that the provider handles vulnerabilities adequately, and ensure that providers inform you about changes.
  • Assess changes at the provider: a major change to its solution is not a substantial modification of your product, but may require a revised risk assessment, adjusted controls or a change of provider.
12Chapter 12

Reporting obligations and vulnerability handling: mandatory since 11 September 2026

Since 11 September 2026, manufacturers have had to report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents — including for products that have long been on the market. The guidance clarifies when the deadline starts to run, which vulnerabilities originating from third-party components must be reported and what counts as a known exploitable vulnerability before placing on the market.

For manufacturers, the reporting obligations are the part of the Regulation that already applies. As the guidance confirms, since 11 September 2026 they have covered all products within scope, including those placed on the market before 11 December 2027. And unlike the vulnerability handling obligations, they continue to apply after the support period has ended. Conversely: for products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 or whose support period has ended, you do not have to comply with the vulnerability handling requirements — but you do have to comply with the reporting obligations.

24 hEarly warning notification with limited information, counted from awareness
72 hNotification with additional information, counted from awareness
14 daysComplete report on the actively exploited vulnerability, after a corrective or mitigating measure is available
1 monthComplete report on the severe incident, counted from the 72-hour notification

What is reported and to whom

You must report every actively exploited vulnerability contained in your product and every severe incident having an impact on the security of the product as soon as you become aware of it. The recipients are, simultaneously, the CSIRT designated as coordinator and ENISA. Under the Regulation, these notifications are submitted via ENISA’s single reporting platform; the coordinating CSIRT in Germany is CERT-Bund at the BSI. The notifications must be updated progressively as your investigation advances. Open-source software stewards must also report actively exploited vulnerabilities, to the extent that they are involved in the development of a product. According to the guidance, this applies once active exploitation has been established, not merely because a vulnerability exists in the codebase.

When the deadline starts

  1. Suspicion or report

    You detect a suspicious event yourself, or a third party brings it to your attention: an individual, a customer, an entity, an authority, a media organisation or another source.

  2. Immediate initial assessment

    Assess the report immediately. The guidance places the emphasis on prompt action, particularly where the vulnerability may pose a significant risk.

  3. Awareness with a reasonable degree of certainty

    You are aware as soon as, after the initial assessment, you establish with a reasonable degree of certainty that a vulnerability in the product is being actively exploited or that a severe incident has compromised the security of the product. The deadlines run from this point.

  4. Early warning, notification, complete report

    Early warning notification without undue delay, at the latest 24 hours after becoming aware; notification without undue delay, at the latest 72 hours after becoming aware; complete report at the latest 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available, or, for severe incidents, at the latest one month after the 72-hour notification. The Regulation calls the complete report the “final report”.

  5. Inform users

    Impacted users and, where appropriate, all users must be informed, in a risk-based and proportionate manner. This does not mean publishing details indiscriminately: particularly in sensitive or essential environments, you may limit detailed information to the customers concerned. If you do not inform users in a timely manner, the CSIRTs that received the notification may inform the users themselves.

Two clarifications spare you unnecessary notifications. First, there is no retroactive reporting: if you were already aware of the active exploitation before 11 September 2026, you do not have to report it. If at that time you knew only of the vulnerability but not of its exploitation, the reporting obligation applies as soon as exploitation subsequently occurs or you become aware of it. Second, you report only actively exploited vulnerabilities contained in your own product, even if they originate from a third-party component. If a component’s vulnerability cannot be exploited in your product, for example because the vulnerable code is not reachable, or if it has not been exploited there, you have no reporting obligation. Voluntary notification remains possible. Handling the vulnerability and reporting it to the component manufacturer are governed by the other manufacturer obligations.

Vulnerabilities in components: report upstream, share fixes

The Regulation requires manufacturers to report vulnerabilities in integrated components to the person or entity manufacturing or maintaining the component, and to share security fixes they have developed themselves with that person or entity. The guidance refers to this as reporting upstream and sharing upstream. It limits reporting upstream to the version of the component that you integrate and sets out clear exceptions for both obligations; it does not specify a deadline.

SituationObligation according to the guidance
Vulnerability in the integrated version of the componentReport upstream via the maintainer’s security policies, coordinated vulnerability disclosure processes or designated reporting channels
The maintainer is demonstrably already aware of the vulnerabilityNo reporting obligation; it is recommended to avoid duplicate reports by checking beforehand, for example in public vulnerability databases, the project’s security advisories or issue trackers
The vulnerability arises only from the integration with your own code or other componentsNo reporting obligation; if the integration reveals previously unknown characteristics of the component, communicating them is recommended
The component no longer has a maintainer, or you no longer rely on the original maintainerNo reporting obligation; it is recommended to inform users of the component via mailing lists, tickets or public vulnerability records
Your own security fix for the componentShare it with the maintainer, where appropriate in a machine-readable and easily integrable form, and for free and open-source software in a licence-compatible manner; you do not have to ensure that it is accepted
The maintainer has a fix, you mitigate differently, for example via configurationNo obligation to share and no obligation to adopt the maintainer’s fix; sharing is recommended where it helps the maintainer

Known exploitable vulnerabilities before placing on the market

The essential cybersecurity requirements include making products available on the market on the basis of the risk assessment and, where applicable, without known exploitable vulnerabilities. A vulnerability is exploitable if an adversary can effectively use it under practical operational conditions; what works only in a lab or in a simulation does not count. According to the guidance, it is known when it is listed in relevant publicly accessible vulnerability databases, such as the European vulnerability database. It may also be known from non-public sources — from coordinated disclosure by security researchers or from your own testing and analysis, including with AI-powered services — or from prominent reporting in reliable specialist or mass media. Check promptly whether a finding is accurate and affects your product. The obligation is risk-based: if a vulnerability becomes known shortly before the product enters the distribution chain, you decide on the basis of the risk assessment whether the product can be securely placed on the market or whether you fix it first. The criteria are severity, exploitability, potential impact and the risks once in use; you may also take into account the risk of postponement, for example where the new version fixes other exploitable vulnerabilities or is needed for the continued operation of critical systems. This is not a blanket exemption; after placing on the market, the obligation to handle vulnerabilities effectively remains.

Testing without a rigid schedule

Throughout the entire support period, the Regulation requires effective and regular tests and reviews. According to the guidance, regular does not mean mechanically repeating an unchanged test campaign at fixed intervals. It means regularly reviewing whether new input, such as newly identified threats or newly discovered vulnerabilities, requires adapted tests, and then executing them, including as regression tests where the product has changed. Frequency, depth and content depend on the risk profile, the evolution of the product and the threat landscape. If the review identifies nothing new, no additional tests are needed; the other vulnerability handling obligations continue to apply in parallel.

13Chapter 13

Interplay with other legislation: vehicles, type-examination certificates and what is still to come

The guidance interprets only the Cyber Resilience Act, but it expressly addresses two interfaces with other product legislation: vehicle components and existing EU type-examination certificates. For both, it draws narrow boundaries. The Commission leaves the door open to further guidance, for example on the relationship with the AI Act and with DORA.

At the outset, the Commission clarifies that its guidance concerns only the Cyber Resilience Act and does not apply to other EU legislation. Section 9.3 of the guidance addresses two interfaces in detail: the exemption for vehicles and their components, and the continued validity of examination certificates issued under other Union harmonisation legislation. Further references to NIS 2, DORA, the GDPR and the Cybersecurity Act are scattered throughout the text.

Vehicles and their components

The CRA does not apply to products to which Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 on the type-approval of motor vehicles of categories M, N and O applies. Products within the scope of Regulation (EU) No 168/2013 for L-category vehicles have been excluded by the Commission through Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1535. The vehicles themselves are therefore not subject to the Cyber Resilience Act. For systems, components, separate technical units, parts and equipment, which the guidance refers to collectively as components, it draws a narrow boundary: these are exempt only if they are exclusively designed and constructed for integration into such vehicles. Whether you supply directly to the vehicle manufacturer or to another economic operator in the automotive supply chain makes no difference, as long as the component is clearly intended and suitable only for ultimate integration into these vehicles.

ScenarioClassification according to the guidance
Component exclusively designed and constructed for integration into such vehicles, distributed via restricted B2B channels of the automotive supply chainNot covered by the Cyber Resilience Act; the restricted channels indicate exclusivity
The same component, supplied to a supplier instead of directly to the vehicle manufacturerLikewise not covered, as long as it is clearly intended and suitable only for ultimate integration into such vehicles
Generic component that can be integrated into different types of productsCovered
Component that is not exclusively suitable, offered through general retail outlets or online channels for the general publicCovered, irrespective of any statements concerning its intended use

What matters are the objective conditions under which the component is made available, not the labels. A notice saying “for vehicle installation only” does not help if the component is technically suitable elsewhere too and is sold freely. Our recommendation for suppliers: document the scope decision for each component, including its suitability and distribution channels, and review mixed portfolios component by component.

Existing type-examination certificates: a bridge until 11 June 2028

Under the Regulation’s transitional provision, EU type-examination certificates and approval decisions issued regarding cybersecurity requirements under other Union harmonisation legislation remain valid until 11 June 2028, unless they expire earlier or the other legislation specifies otherwise. The guidance interprets this bridge narrowly. It holds only for the cybersecurity risks and requirements of the legislation under which the certificate was issued. For those risks, you do not have to reassess conformity solely for the purposes of the Cyber Resilience Act for products that you place on the market from 11 December 2027 until 11 June 2028. This applies to mandatory procedures involving a notified body as well as to voluntarily chosen ones. Beyond 11 June 2028, you cannot rely on it for the purposes of the Cyber Resilience Act, even if the certificate remains valid for longer under other legislation.

Basis of the certificateCovered, to the extent addressed in the certificatePossible gaps according to the guidance
Radio Equipment Directive Delegated Act, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30Network protection, protection of personal data and privacy, prevention of fraudVulnerability handling processes, data minimisation, reduction of the attack surface and other product-specific aspects
Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230, fully applicable as of 20 January 2027“Protection against corruption”, i.e. against tampering, as well as safety and reliability of control systems under the relevant sections of the Machinery RegulationAll other cybersecurity risks not covered by the certificate

For both cases, the guidance stresses the same point: a valid certificate does not replace the comprehensive cybersecurity risk assessment under the Cyber Resilience Act and does not exempt you from its other obligations. A certificate under the Radio Equipment Directive does not in itself demonstrate full compliance with the Cyber Resilience Act. It serves as evidence for the risks it covers; you must assess and mitigate gaps, irrespective of whether the certificate remains valid. Products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 are subject to the legislation applicable at that time, unless they are substantially modified on or after that date.

Other legal acts referred to in the guidance

  • NIS 2 Directive and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690: cloud computing services fall under NIS 2. Manufacturers can use evidence that cloud providers fulfil these obligations as due diligence evidence, and the interpretation of “becoming aware” in the reporting obligations is aligned with the Implementing Regulation.
  • GDPR: for the start of the reporting deadlines, the guidance is also aligned with Guidelines 9/2022 on personal data breach notification, so that manufacturers with parallel reporting obligations can work consistently.
  • DORA: evidence of fulfilment of DORA obligations is among the assurance artefacts that can be reused for third-party remote services.
  • Cybersecurity Act, Regulation (EU) 2019/881: the basis for European cybersecurity certification schemes, which play a role in conformity assessment and as evidence.
  • Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392: technical description of the categories of important and critical products.
  • The Commission’s “Blue Guide”: reference point for placing on the market, making available on the market and substantial modifications, and for the manufacturer’s responsibility for all risks, even when applying harmonised standards.

Outlook: AI Act and DORA

On the basis of the Regulation, the Commission may consider issuing further guidance, including for manufacturers that are also subject to other Union harmonisation legislation or related Union legal acts. As possible topics, it cites the interplay with the AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, and with DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector. It does not give a timetable. Artificial intelligence appears only marginally in the current guidance: your own testing with AI-powered services can make a vulnerability “known”. Our assessment: anyone integrating AI functions into products with digital elements or supplying financial entities should not wait for this guidance, but should set up risk assessment, reporting channels and evidence now in such a way that they serve several regulatory frameworks.

14Chapter 14

What to do now: our roadmap to 11 December 2027

This chapter is a recommendation from VamiSec, not a requirement of the Commission. It translates the guidance into a sequence based on the dates of the Regulation: first what already applies, then the decisions on which everything else depends.

DateWhat applies
11 June 2026The provisions on the notification of conformity assessment bodies apply
11 September 2026Reporting obligations for actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents apply, including for products already on the market
17 November 2026Commission guidance published in the Official Journal (C/2026/6013)
20 January 2027Machinery Regulation fully applicable, relevant for manufacturers of machinery
11 December 2027Full application: manufacturer obligations, conformity assessment, EU declaration of conformity and CE marking
11 June 2028Existing EU type-examination certificates under other product legislation can be relied on for the purposes of the Cyber Resilience Act until this date at the latest

Immediately: make reporting operational — mandatory since 11 September 2026

  • Define and publish intake channels for reports, for customers, security researchers, authorities and partners.
  • Introduce triage with a documented initial assessment, using the criterion “reasonable degree of certainty” and a timestamp for the moment of awareness.
  • Create a reporting runbook with roles, deputies, deadline tracking and templates for the early warning notification, the notification and the complete report.
  • Prepare the reporting route via the single reporting platform provided for by the Regulation, and identify the competent CSIRT designated as coordinator.
  • Include all products within scope, including products already on the market and products no longer supported.
  • Triage vulnerabilities in third-party components: is the vulnerable code reachable in your product, and is it being actively exploited there?
  • Define criteria for informing users: recipients, level of detail, timing.
  • If you act as an open-source software steward: set up a publicly accessible channel for reports of active exploitation, because stewards usually learn of it through third parties.

Within 90 days: product inventory and scope decisions

  • Create a product inventory covering hardware, software, variants, versions, separately offered modules, companion apps and back-ends.
  • Delineate software: locally executed software and apps are products with digital elements. Web applications accessed only through a browser generally are not, but may be covered as remote data processing if they support a product function.
  • Assign companion software: software necessary to operate, configure, control or use a device is part of the product, even if it is obtained through an app store.
  • Check the data connection: does the product exchange digitally encoded information, or does it merely trigger a function via electrical signals?
  • Clarify the open-source role for each project: manufacturer, open-source software steward or mere contributor.
  • Record all remote processing and document the two remote data processing test questions for each case.
  • Flag legacy designs: products designed before 11 December 2027 but placed on the market after that date.

Within six months: risk assessment, classification, conformity route

  • Set up the risk assessment for each product or product family, with residual risk criteria based on the product rather than on risk appetite or costs.
  • Determine the core functionality of each product and each separately offered module and compare it against the category descriptions in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392.
  • Determine the conformity route, for class I depending on whether references of harmonised standards have been published in the Official Journal; where a third party is involved, plan early with a conformity assessment body.
  • Operationalise due diligence for components: requirements per component, evidence from the component manufacturer, risk-based checks and the software bill of materials required by the Regulation.
  • Treat cloud and SaaS providers that are not your own remote data processing solution like components: obtain evidence and lay down security guarantees and change notifications in contracts.
  • Compare existing certificates under radio equipment or machinery legislation against the risk assessment and plan for the gaps.
  • Include remote data processing solutions and their interfaces in the risk assessment, security requirements, testing and reporting process.

Within twelve months: processes, support period, documentation

  • Add an update classification to the release process: does an update change the intended purpose, or does it introduce new or increased risks not covered by the risk assessment? Scale and complexity are not the yardstick.
  • Justify the support period for each product on the basis of the expected use time, make the end date visible with month and year at the time of purchase and implement the end-of-support notification.
  • Define a version strategy: if you only want to patch the latest version, you need a free upgrade path without additional costs for users.
  • Introduce a release check for known exploitable vulnerabilities with a documented, risk-based decision.
  • Describe reporting upstream and sharing security fixes with component manufacturers and maintainers as a procedure, with a directory of channels, duplicate checks and licence checks.
  • Switch the test concept to triggers: new threats, newly discovered vulnerabilities, product changes.
  • Build up the technical documentation for each product: core functionality, risk assessment, components, remote data processing, support period, applied standards and additional measures.
  • Collect evidence: test reports, due diligence records, release records and reporting drills.

By 11 December 2027: conformity assessment, EU declaration of conformity, CE marking

From 11 December 2027, the Regulation requires that, before a product is placed on the market, the applicable conformity assessment procedure has been carried out, the EU declaration of conformity drawn up and the CE marking affixed. According to the guidance, this also applies to legacy designs that continue to be placed on the market without redesign. For hardware, each individual unit counts; a standalone software version, by contrast, is considered placed on the market when it is first offered. Our recommendation: plan a buffer so that the assessment is completed before the first unit is placed on the market after the cut-off date. For product families, you can use a single risk assessment, a single set of technical documentation and a single EU declaration of conformity if the variants are clearly identified in them and do not differ in their cybersecurity properties.

The guidance is not binding; an authoritative interpretation of the Regulation can only be given by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the examples in the guidance do not replace a case-by-case assessment. This analysis does not constitute legal advice.

Integrated gap analysis

CRA gap analysis: where do your products stand against the guidance?

In around 15 minutes through up to 45 questions in eight action areas — from scope through open source, risk assessment and support period to remote data processing and reporting. Four profile inputs control the questions and the target level, so that the assessment remains proportionate to your portfolio. Each question cites its reference in the guidance. Your result stays in your browser; levels, weighting and target levels are a classification by VamiSec.

0 / 45 questions answered

00 / 08Your product profile

Four inputs control the analysis. Whether at least one of your products is important or critical determines the target level. Product type, open-source publication and legacy designs show or hide the relevant questions — the core questions on inventory, risk assessment, components, modifications, support period and reporting apply to every manufacturer.

  1. Is at least one of your products an important (class I/II) or critical product?

    What matters is the core functionality: exactly one per product, determined objectively by main features and technical capabilities — not by marketing. Compare it with the list of important products of classes I and II and the list of critical products; the technical descriptions of the categories are set out in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392. Examples from the guidance: routers, antivirus software or SIEM systems (class I), firewalls or intrusion detection systems (class II). An integrated important or critical component does not automatically make your product itself important or critical. “Not yet clear” assumes the higher target level as a precaution.

  2. Which types of products with digital elements do you place on the market? (multiple choice)

    Devices/hardware with software includes firmware as well as companion apps and drivers without which the device does not work. Standalone software is supplied to the user and executed on the user’s side — app, desktop application, browser extension, client. Remote data processing means backend and cloud functions that you develop yourself or that are developed under your responsibility, and without which a product could not perform a function; a pure web application in the browser is not a product in itself. The remote data processing action area appears only with this selection, four questions on companion apps, hardware borderline cases, spare parts and existing evidence only for devices, two questions on form of delivery and versions only for standalone software, and the question on patch strategy for software and devices.

  3. Do you publish or maintain free and open-source software (as a maintainer, foundation or company)?

    This means projects whose development, releases and distribution you decide on — including libraries that you develop for your own products and publish separately, or a community version alongside a paid version. Anyone who only contributes code to third-party projects is a contributor and selects “No”; commit access alone does not change this. “Yes” shows four questions on FOSS status, monetisation, the steward role and steward reporting; the two questions on open-source components in your products apply to all manufacturers regardless.

  4. After 11 December 2027, will you place products on the market whose design was created before that date?

    Typical for devices that continue to be manufactured as a series: every unit placed on the market from 11 December 2027 must comply with the Regulation — even if the type or model was developed earlier. According to the guidance, a redesign is not automatically necessary; the risk assessment decides. Units placed on the market before 11 December 2027 are not covered as long as they are not substantially modified afterwards; however, the reporting obligations have applied to them since 11 September 2026. “Yes” shows three questions on the legacy design portfolio, risk assessment and evidence of conformity.

Target level3 — Effective & demonstrable

For important products of classes I and II and for critical products, we set level 3 (“Effective & demonstrable”). Background: class II and critical products undergo conformity assessment with an external body, and so does class I if you do not apply in full a relevant harmonised standard that covers all risks of the core functionality — your evidence must then withstand scrutiny by third parties. Neither the Regulation nor the guidance provides for maturity levels; the target level is a classification by VamiSec.

Free whitepaper

CRA Guidance for CISOs — the Commission’s interpretation in practice

The whitepaper translates the guidance published on 17 November 2026 into concrete review steps for CISOs and product owners: from scope through open source, substantial modification and support period to core functionality, remote data processing and reporting obligations — with references, a gap analysis checklist and a roadmap to 11 December 2027. Available in German and, as “CRA Guidance for CISOs”, in English.

Cover of the VamiSec whitepaper CRA Guidance for CISOs
18 chaptersGerman and EnglishAs of 21 November 2026PDF, free of charge
  • Scope and open source: software, web applications, devices with a companion app, legacy designs, maintainers, contributors and stewards
  • Substantial modification, spare parts, support period and core functionality — with the examples from the guidance
  • Remote data processing with all five use cases and the reporting obligations that have applied since 11 September 2026
  • Gap analysis checklist and roadmap to 11 December 2027, separated into Regulation, Commission interpretation and VamiSec recommendation
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CRA Guidance for CISOs — practical guide to the Commission guidance on the Cyber Resilience Act

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What the whitepaper “CRA Guidance for CISOs” contains

Scope and open source

When software, web applications, source code, devices with a companion app and legacy designs fall under the CRA — and when free and open-source software is covered: maintainers, contributors, monetisation and the role of the open-source software steward, each with the relevant examples from the guidance.

Substantial modification, support period, core functionality

When a software update or a spare part leads to a substantial modification, how to derive the support period from the expected use time and how the core functionality determines the class and the conformity assessment procedure.

Remote data processing and reporting obligations

The two-condition test for remote data processing with all five use cases from the guidance, treating cloud providers like third-party components and the reporting obligations that have applied since 11 September 2026 — with the start of the deadline, third-party components and reporting upstream.

Gap analysis checklist and roadmap

A self-assessment checklist along the eight topic areas of this page and a roadmap to the date of application on 11 December 2027 — clearly separated into what the Regulation requires, how the Commission interprets it and what VamiSec recommends.

Foundation

The Regulation first, then the interpretation: the CRA deep dive

The guidance presupposes the Regulation: it explains selected key provisions and expressly does not cover the entire scope. The basics — product classes, essential cybersecurity requirements, conformity assessment and CE marking, reporting deadlines and obligations across the life cycle — are explained in our deep dive on the EU Cyber Resilience Act. You can find the official text of the guidance in all official languages in the Official Journal on EUR-Lex.

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847binding obligations, classes and deadlines
C/2026/6013the Commission’s interpretation, not binding
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392technical description of the product categories
  • The Regulation has been in force since 10 December 2024; the reporting obligations have applied since 11 September 2026, and the other obligations of economic operators apply from 11 December 2027.
  • The Regulation requires the Commission to cover at least four topics: scope including remote data processing and open source, support periods, substantial modification and the interplay with other EU legislation.
  • As early as 3 December 2025, the Commission had published frequently asked questions to help with preparation; the guidance followed after a public consultation from 3 March to 13 April 2026.
  • According to its own statement, the Commission may consider further guidance, for example on the interplay with the AI Act and DORA.

The text published in the Official Journal is authoritative. The German language version differs from the English one in some places — for example where it speaks of “Inkrafttreten” (entry into force) when the date of application on 11 December 2027 is meant.

VamiGRC

How to implement this with VamiGRC

VamiGRC takes your products through defined release gates, attaches CRA requirements to the right phase and links SBOM, suppliers and evidence – all the way to a prepared notification for BSI and ENISA.

CRA & product security in VamiGRCCRA Readiness CheckFree · 10 questions · about 3 minutes
Glossary

Glossary: the terms of the CRA guidance

36 terms, mostly in the official English terminology of the guidance, explained in our own words — with the German term for comparison with the German language version.

Cyber Resilience Act (CRA)Cyberresilienzverordnung (CRA)
Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements. It has been in force since 10 December 2024; its reporting obligations have applied since 11 September 2026, and the other obligations of economic operators apply from 11 December 2027.
Commission guidanceLeitlinien der Kommission
Communication C/2026/6013, in which the Commission sets out its interpretation of key provisions of the Cyber Resilience Act, published in the Official Journal on 17 November 2026. It is not binding; only the Court of Justice of the EU can give an authoritative interpretation.
Date of applicationGeltungsbeginn
The date from which the obligations of the Regulation apply in full: 11 December 2027. In several places, the German language version of the guidance speaks of “Inkrafttreten” (entry into force) but means this date — the Regulation has already been in force since 10 December 2024.
Product with digital elementsProdukt mit digitalen Elementen
A software or hardware product, including its remote data processing solutions and components placed on the market separately. It is covered if its intended purpose or reasonably foreseeable use includes a data connection to a device or network.
Placing on the marketInverkehrbringen
The first making available of a product on the Union market; every subsequent supply of the same product is a making available on the market. For standalone software, all copies of a version are considered placed on the market with the first offer.
Commercial activityGeschäftstätigkeit
Supply of a product in a business-related context, whether in return for payment or free of charge. Whether it exists must be assessed case by case, for example by regularity, the characteristics of the product and the intention of the supplier; for free and open-source software, monetisation is the main deciding factor.
ManufacturerHersteller
A person who supplies a product with digital elements under its own name or trademark in the course of a commercial activity and thereby places it on the market. A person who substantially modifies a product and makes it available on the market is also considered a manufacturer.
Importers and distributorsEinführer und Händler
Importers place products from manufacturers outside the EU on the Union market, distributors make them available in the supply chain; both have their own obligations. If they carry out a substantial modification, they are themselves considered manufacturers.
Standalone softwareEigenständige Software
Software that is not combined with hardware into one product, such as an app or a desktop program — distributed digitally or on a physical medium. The rules on placing on the market apply to it per version; software belonging to a device follows the timing of the hardware.
Data connectionDatenverbindung
Transmission of information in binary form that a source deliberately encodes according to a defined scheme and that a recipient can read as data. In the Commission’s view, signals that only trigger or power a function are not a data connection.
Complex systemKomplexes System
An interplay of several hardware and software elements that is placed on the market as a single product, often with long development and operating periods. It is not exempt; technical constraints must be documented and mitigated by compensatory measures.
Remote data processingDatenfernverarbeitung
Data processing at a distance for which the manufacturer has designed and developed the software itself or under its responsibility, and without which the product could not perform one of its functions. It is part of the product — regardless of who operates it.
Free and open-source software (FOSS)Freie und quelloffene Software
Software whose licence freely permits use, modification and redistribution and whose source code is openly shared. Source code that is accessible only to paying customers or a limited group does not meet the definition.
MaintainerMaintainer
A person who publishes free and open-source software and exercises primary control over its development, releases and distribution; the software is under that person’s responsibility. In some places, the German language version of the guidance calls maintainers “Wartungsbetriebe”.
ContributorContributor
A person who contributes source code to free and open-source software without controlling releases, roadmap or governance. To that extent, contributors are not subject to the Regulation — not even with commit access.
Open-source software stewardVerwalter quelloffener Software
A legal person that systematically supports, on a sustained basis, the development of free and open-source software that is intended for commercial activities but not placed on the market — a foundation, for example. A separate, lighter regime of obligations applies to it; the reporting obligations depend on the type of support.
Due diligenceSorgfaltspflicht
The manufacturer’s obligation, when integrating third-party components — including free and open-source software — to determine what they must deliver for the security of the product and to verify this on a risk basis. This does not make the manufacturer responsible for the conformity of the component itself.
Substantial modificationWesentliche Änderung
A change after placing on the market that affects compliance with the essential cybersecurity requirements or modifies the intended purpose for which the product was assessed. For software updates, what counts is whether new or increased risks arise that the risk assessment does not cover; the consequence is a new placing on the market.
Security updateSicherheitsaktualisierung
An update whose primary purpose is to reduce cybersecurity risks. As a rule, it is not a substantial modification — unless it changes the intended purpose or introduces new risks, for example through new data flows or externally reachable interfaces.
Spare partErsatzteil
A part that replaces an identical component, is manufactured according to the same specifications and is supplied specifically to repair or extend the durability of a product already placed on the market; it does not fall under the Regulation. The yardstick for “identical” is the functional role and the security-relevant characteristics.
Support periodUnterstützungszeitraum
The period during which the manufacturer effectively handles vulnerabilities in a product, including its components. It reflects the expected use time and is, as a rule, at least five years — a minimum, not a standard.
Core functionalityKernfunktion
The main features and technical capabilities without which a product could not fulfil its intended purpose. Every product has exactly one core functionality; it determines whether the product is important, critical or part of the default category.
Important products with digital elementsWichtige Produkte
Products whose core functionality corresponds to a category on the list of important products, divided into class I and class II — for example operating systems, routers or firewalls. They are subject to stricter conformity assessment procedures than the default category.
Critical products with digital elementsKritische Produkte
Products whose core functionality corresponds to a category on the list of critical products. According to the guidance, their conformity assessment always requires the involvement of a third party.
Default categoryStandardkategorie
Not a term of the Regulation but the guidance’s usage for products without a core functionality from the lists of important or critical products. For them, self-assessment under the internal control procedure (module A) is always sufficient.
Essential cybersecurity requirementsGrundlegende Cybersicherheitsanforderungen
The Regulation’s requirements for the design, development and production of a product and for the handling of vulnerabilities. Which of them apply in the individual case and how they are implemented follows from the cybersecurity risk assessment.
Cybersecurity risk assessmentBewertung der Cybersicherheitsrisiken
A mandatory assessment in which the manufacturer identifies the relevant risks of its product and derives appropriate measures — taking into account the intended purpose, reasonably foreseeable use, operational environment, assets to be protected and expected use time. It must be kept up to date during the support period.
Residual cybersecurity riskRestrisiko
The risk that remains after the measures have been implemented. The yardstick is an appropriate level of cybersecurity — not internal risk appetite, business strategy or costs; it cannot be shifted to users by means of a warning notice.
Family of products with digital elementsProduktfamilie
Variants, models or configurations with the same architecture, the same security-relevant design, the same intended purpose and the same risks. One risk assessment, one set of technical documentation and one conformity assessment procedure may suffice for them; security-relevant differences such as different interfaces or update mechanisms must be reflected separately.
Conformity assessment procedureKonformitätsbewertungsverfahren
The procedure used before placing on the market to demonstrate that a product meets the essential requirements — from self-assessment under module A to procedures with third-party involvement under module B+C or module H. Which one applies depends on the core functionality.
Presumption of conformityKonformitätsvermutung
Anyone who applies a harmonised standard whose reference has been published in the Official Journal is presumed to conform with the requirements it covers. The presumption extends only as far as the standard; for additional functionalities that are not covered, compliance must be demonstrated in another way.
Actively exploited vulnerabilityAktiv ausgenutzte Schwachstelle
A vulnerability that is not merely exploitable but is actually being exploited. Manufacturers report it as soon as, after a prompt initial assessment, they know with a reasonable degree of certainty that a vulnerability in their product is being actively exploited — mandatory since 11 September 2026.
Severe incidentSchwerwiegender Sicherheitsvorfall
An incident that has an impact on the security of a product and is considered severe under the criteria of the Regulation. It must also be reported; the complete report follows no later than one month after the 72-hour notification.
Known exploitable vulnerabilityBekannte ausnutzbare Schwachstelle
A vulnerability that is exploitable under practical operational conditions and known — for example from public vulnerability databases, from coordinated disclosure, from the manufacturer’s own tests, including AI-assisted ones, or from prominent reports by reliable media. Whether the product can nevertheless be placed on the market is decided by the manufacturer on a risk basis.
Reporting upstreamVorgelagerte Meldung
The obligation to report a vulnerability in an integrated component to the person or entity manufacturing or maintaining the component, and to share one’s own fixes. Reporting is not required, for example, where that person or entity demonstrably already knows about the vulnerability or the component is no longer maintained.
Single reporting platformEinheitliche Meldeplattform
The platform established by ENISA through which notifications under the Regulation go to the CSIRT designated as coordinator — in Germany, CERT-Bund at the BSI — and to ENISA. The guidance itself does not name the platform, only the two recipients.
FAQ

Frequently asked questions on the Commission’s CRA guidance

Short answers to typical questions from product management, product security, engineering and compliance — based on the guidance of 17 November 2026, not legal advice.

No. The guidance is not binding on economic operators; only the Court of Justice of the European Union can give an authoritative interpretation of the Cyber Resilience Act. However, it reflects the Commission’s interpretation and is expressly also intended to support the work of market surveillance authorities, notifying authorities and notified bodies, so that the CRA is enforced uniformly across the Union. The examples do not replace a case-by-case assessment. Our recommendation: where you depart from the Commission’s line, document the reasons.

Not in itself. In the Commission’s view, software that is executed remotely and that users merely access — for example a web application or progressive web app used exclusively in the browser — is not a product with digital elements; nor are websites. However, it is covered as remote data processing if a product could not perform one of its functions without it and the manufacturer developed the software itself or under its responsibility. Apps, desktop clients and browser extensions for your service, by contrast, are separate products.

When it introduces new or increased cybersecurity risks that the risk assessment does not cover, or changes the intended purpose. The yardstick is the risk, not the scope or complexity: as non-exhaustive test criteria, the guidance names new threat vectors, new attack scenarios and a changed likelihood or impact of known attack scenarios. Even a small feature such as “remember me” can be substantial (Example 44 of the guidance). Security updates are, as a rule, not substantial — unless they change the intended purpose or introduce new risks that the risk assessment did not anticipate, for example through substantially changed data flows or new externally reachable interfaces.

As long as the product is expected to be in use — as a rule at least five years, shorter only if the expected use time is shorter. The Commission stresses that five years is a minimum and not a standard; criteria include reasonable user expectations, the nature and intended purpose of the product and relevant Union law on product lifetime. You state the end date at the time of purchase, at least with month and year. After a substantial modification, you reassess: if the factors determining the use time remain the same, the original period continues — even if less than five years remain.

Contributors who only contribute code and control neither releases nor roadmap or governance are not subject to the Regulation — not even with commit access. Responsibility lies with the maintainers. They become manufacturers if they monetise the software, for example through a price, a paid or enterprise version, the monetisation of other services or personal data as a condition of use; a donation link, optional support or sponsorship is not enough for this. Legal persons that provide sustained support for non-monetised software intended for commercial activities can be open-source software stewards with lighter obligations — and not-for-profit organisations that use all earnings after costs for not-for-profit objectives can be so even if they monetise the software.

Not necessarily. If you place units of a previously developed type on the market from 11 December 2027, the Regulation does not, in the Commission’s view, automatically require a redesign. What matters is an up-to-date cybersecurity risk assessment: if it demonstrates appropriate and effective measures, you may rely on it. You do not have to recreate historical documentation, and evidence can be grouped for product families. Conformity assessment, the EU declaration of conformity, CE marking and vulnerability handling nevertheless remain mandatory — and if the assessment reveals gaps, you need additional measures.

Only under certain conditions. Exempt are spare parts that replace identical components, are manufactured according to the same specifications and are supplied specifically to repair or extend the durability of a product already placed on the market — recognisable, for example, from the product reference in the order or offer, or from supply via after-sales service. “Identical” is measured by the functional role and security-relevant characteristics: a different chipset may be harmless, a different cryptography implementation not. Non-identical spare parts are separate products within the meaning of the Regulation.

When its core functionality corresponds to a category on the lists of important (class I or II) or critical products; the technical descriptions are set out in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392. According to the guidance, every product has exactly one core functionality, determined objectively rather than by marketing; an integrated operating system does not make a smartphone an operating system. For class I, self-assessment is sufficient only with a harmonised standard applied in full whose reference has been published in the Official Journal and that covers all risks of the core functionality. Class II and critical products require third-party involvement; important products placed on the market as free and open-source software, by contrast, may use the procedures of the default category.

Your backend is part of the product if two conditions are met together: without the processing, the product could not perform one of its functions, and the software was designed and developed by you or under your responsibility according to your specifications. Who operates it is irrelevant; your own servers or a private cloud also count. Typical examples are remote control, synchronisation, onboarding, configuration, update distribution and identity and access management. Not included are telemetry for statistics only, HR, CRM and CI/CD systems or standard SaaS that you buy in — you treat the latter like a third-party component.

Yes, since 11 September 2026 — for all products in scope, including those placed on the market before 11 December 2027 and also after the end of the support period. Actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents are notified simultaneously to the CSIRT designated as coordinator and to ENISA: early warning within 24 hours, notification within 72 hours, complete report 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available (vulnerability) or one month after the 72-hour notification (incident). The deadline runs from becoming aware with a reasonable degree of certainty after a prompt initial assessment. There is no retroactive reporting.

To the CSIRT and ENISA only if the vulnerability is being actively exploited in your product — but then also if it originates from a third-party component. If the vulnerable code is not reachable in your product or nothing has been exploited, there is no reporting obligation; you can still report voluntarily. Independently of this, the Regulation requires you to report vulnerabilities in integrated components to their manufacturer or maintainer and to share your own fixes. According to the guidance, reporting upstream is not required if the maintainer demonstrably knows about the vulnerability or the component is no longer maintained.

The final version is around 23 per cent longer: 257 instead of 232 paragraphs, 67 instead of 55 examples. New are a section distinguishing locally executed software from pure web applications, a section on the support period after substantial modifications and explanations on regular testing. The spare parts exemption is now linked to the supply context and security-relevant characteristics. Substantial modifications to existing products no longer automatically require full conformity of the entire product, as long as the product as a whole is not negatively affected. For the reporting obligations, the cut-off date, existing products and the exclusion of retroactive reporting were added.

Little: the guidance concerns the Cyber Resilience Act alone. The Commission keeps open the option of issuing further guidance, for example on the interplay with the AI Act and with DORA. DORA becomes concrete in one place: evidence that providers of remote services present on DORA or NIS 2 obligations can be reused by manufacturers when assessing third-party providers, as can evidence under ISO/IEC 27001 or 27017. By contrast, the chapter on other legislation expressly deals with vehicle components and with certificates under the Radio Equipment Directive and the Machinery Regulation.

The integrated gap analysis translates the guidance into review questions on eight topic areas — from scope to reporting. First you define your profile: product type, important or critical products, open source, legacy designs. Then you rate each question on a scale from 0 to 3 and receive a maturity level, gaps with measures and a roadmap for 30, 90 and 180 days. Your answers remain in your browser. The result is a self-assessment — not legal advice and not a conformity assessment.

Standards & Sources

The content on this page is based on the following publicly available guides and studies.

European Commission · 2026

Commission guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), C/2026/6013

Primary source of this page — communication from the Commission, dated 9 November 2026, published in the Official Journal (C series) on 17 November 2026; 9 chapters, 257 paragraphs, 67 examples, 5 use cases; not binding

European Parliament and Council of the EU · 2024

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act)

Legal basis — OJ L of 20 November 2024, in force since 10 December 2024; notification of conformity assessment bodies from 11 June 2026, reporting obligations (Art. 14) since 11 September 2026, full application from 11 December 2027

European Commission · 2025

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392 — technical description of the categories of important and critical products with digital elements

Yardstick for mapping the core functionality; used in the guidance for operating systems, routers and antivirus software, among others (Examples 57, 58, 62, 63)

European Commission · 2025

Frequently asked questions (FAQs) on the implementation of the Cyber Resilience Act

Published on 3 December 2025 and available via the Commission’s CRA pages; the guidance refers to them (para. 5)

European Commission · 2022

Commission Notice — The “Blue Guide” on the implementation of EU product rules 2022, 2022/C 247/01

OJ C 247 of 29 June 2022, p. 1; used by the guidance for placing on the market, commercial activity, substantial modifications and harmonised standards

European Parliament and Council of the EU · 2019

Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 on market surveillance and compliance of products

Market surveillance framework to which products within the scope of the CRA are also subject (para. 3)

European Parliament and Council of the EU · 2022

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive)

In the guidance, the reference point for cloud computing services, the European vulnerability database and evidence from IaaS providers (paras 183, 233; use cases 8.3.2, 8.3.4)

European Commission · 2024

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 laying down rules for the application of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 as regards cybersecurity risk-management measures

According to the guidance, reusable evidence for third-party remote services and the yardstick for the concept of becoming aware under the reporting obligations (paras 207, 212)

European Parliament and Council of the EU · 2022

Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA)

DORA evidence as reusable proof for third-party remote services (para. 207); possible topic of further guidance (para. 9)

European Parliament and Council of the EU · 2024

Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act)

Named by the Commission as a possible topic of further guidance on the interplay with the CRA (para. 9)

European Parliament and Council of the EU · 2019

Regulation (EU) 2019/881 (Cybersecurity Act)

Basis of European cybersecurity certification schemes — relevant for conformity assessment, presumption of conformity and evidence (paras 148, 153, 207)

European Commission · 2022

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30 supplementing the Radio Equipment Directive 2014/53/EU

Existing EU type-examination certificates remain valid for CRA purposes for the cybersecurity risks covered until 11 June 2028 at the latest (paras 247–254)

European Parliament and Council of the EU · 2023

Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 on machinery (Machinery Regulation)

Fully applicable from 20 January 2027; certificates remain valid for CRA purposes for the cybersecurity risks covered until 11 June 2028 at the latest (paras 255–257)

European Parliament and Council of the EU · 2019

Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 on type-approval requirements for motor vehicles as regards their general safety

Vehicles and components designed and constructed exclusively for them are excluded from the CRA, generic components are not (paras 241–246)

European Parliament and Council of the EU · 2024

Directive (EU) 2024/2853 on liability for defective products (Product Liability Directive)

According to the guidance, computer code itself is not a product under product liability law; liability under national tort law remains possible (footnote 9)

Planning CRA implementation on the basis of the guidance?

VamiSec supports manufacturers with scope and role clarification, cybersecurity risk assessment and threat modelling, classification by core functionality, reporting processes and readiness for the single reporting platform, as well as with product security and IoT pentests — as implementation support, not as conformity assessment or legal advice.