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MAESTRO: Threat Modeling for Agentic AI

How to systematically identify, assess and treat threats in systems of autonomous AI agents using the Cloud Security Alliance's seven-layer framework.

AI agents that plan autonomously, invoke tools and cooperate with other agents fundamentally change the attack surface: threats no longer arise only in code, but in the agents' goals, memory and interactions. Classic threat modeling methods such as STRIDE or PASTA were designed for deterministic software and capture this dynamic only incompletely. That is why, in early February 2025, the Cloud Security Alliance published MAESTRO, a dedicated threat modeling framework for agentic AI that decomposes systems into seven architectural layers and analyzes threats both layer by layer and across layers. Combined with the OWASP catalog of agentic threats, this yields a practical approach for security leaders.

The Essentials at a Glance

01

What MAESTRO is: origin and core idea

MAESTRO stands for “Multi-Agent Environment, Security, Threat, Risk, and Outcome”. The framework was published on February 6, 2025 by Ken Huang (CEO & Chief AI Officer of DistributedApps.ai) on the Cloud Security Alliance blog and is explicitly designed for agentic AI – that is, for systems in which AI agents make decisions autonomously, use tools and interact with one another. At its core is a seven-layer reference architecture along which threats are identified layer by layer. MAESTRO does not replace established methods; it deliberately extends them with agentic and ML-specific perspectives.

02

Why STRIDE, PASTA and LINDDUN are not enough

Established methods model software with predictable behavior. According to the CSA's rationale, STRIDE lacks a view of AI-specific threats such as adversarial attacks and the unpredictable learning and decision-making behavior of agents; PASTA addresses neither attacks on models (such as model extraction) nor the complexity of autonomous decisions; the privacy-focused LINDDUN does not cover key security threats to agentic systems such as data poisoning. On top of that come aspects that none of the classic methods captures systematically: unpredictable agent behavior, goal misalignment, collusion between agents and risks from the AI supply chain. These are exactly the gaps MAESTRO is built to close.

03

The seven layers of the reference architecture

MAESTRO decomposes an agentic AI system into seven layers: Foundation Models (layer 1, the base models), Data Operations (layer 2, including data storage and RAG pipelines), Agent Frameworks (layer 3, development frameworks and orchestration), Deployment and Infrastructure (layer 4), Evaluation and Observability (layer 5, monitoring and assessment), and Agent Ecosystem (layer 7, the interplay of many agents in marketplaces and business applications). Security and Compliance (layer 6) plays a special role: it is defined as a vertical cross-cutting layer that runs through all the others. Each layer brings its own threat classes, responsibilities and controls.

04

The approach: six steps, including cross-layer analysis

The process described by the CSA comprises six steps: system decomposition along the seven layers, layer-specific threat modeling, identification of cross-layer threats, risk assessment, mitigation planning, and implementation with continuous monitoring. The cross-layer threats are particularly relevant: a compromised library in the agent framework affects the other levels, access rights can escalate between layers, and goal misalignment effects of individual agents cascade through the entire ecosystem. Threat modeling with MAESTRO is therefore not a one-off document but a recurring process that is run again whenever the architecture changes.

05

How it works together with the OWASP agentic threats

With “Agentic AI – Threats and Mitigations” (v1.0 from February 2025, currently version 1.1 from December 2025), the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative maintains a catalog of 17 agentic threats (T1–T17) – from Memory Poisoning (T1) and Tool Misuse (T2) through Rogue Agents in Multi-Agent Systems (T13) to Insecure Inter-Agent Protocol Abuse (T16, including protocols such as MCP and A2A) and Supply Chain Compromise (T17). The OWASP document itself references MAESTRO as a layer-based extension of STRIDE for agentic AI. In practice the two complement each other: MAESTRO provides the structure (where in the system to look), the OWASP catalog provides the content (what to look for in each layer).

06

Practical workflow: applying MAESTRO in your organization

A typical run starts with scope definition (which agents, tools, data flows and interfaces belong to the system) and an architecture walkthrough in which all components are mapped to the seven layers. Threats are then identified per layer – with the OWASP catalog serving as a checklist – and complemented by cross-layer scenarios. The assessed risks feed into a prioritized mitigation plan and into existing processes such as the secure development lifecycle and the ISMS. The CSA itself has shown that the method also works for agent protocols: in April 2025, Google's Agent-to-Agent protocol (A2A) was fully modeled with MAESTRO.

Standards & Sources

The content on this page is based on the following publicly available guides and studies.

Cloud Security Alliance · 2025

Agentic AI Threat Modeling Framework: MAESTRO

Original publication by Ken Huang (February 6, 2025) with the acronym, the seven-layer reference architecture and the six-step approach including cross-layer threats.

OWASP GenAI Security Project / Agentic Security Initiative · 2025

Agentic AI – Threats and Mitigations, Version 1.1

Catalog of 17 agentic threats (T1–T17) with a taxonomy navigator (as of December 2025); references MAESTRO as a layer-based STRIDE extension for agentic AI.

Cloud Security Alliance · 2025

Threat Modeling Google's A2A Protocol with the MAESTRO Framework

Worked example by Ken Huang and Idan Habler (April 30, 2025): a complete MAESTRO analysis of an agent-to-agent protocol with layer-specific threats.

Cloud Security Alliance · 2025

Agentic AI Red Teaming Guide

Complementary CSA guide (May 28, 2025) for hands-on testing of agentic systems, covering among other things permission escalation, memory manipulation and orchestration failures.

Agentic AI in production – is your threat landscape under control?

We model your agent architecture along the MAESTRO layers and prioritize risks and mitigations together with you. Contact us for a no-obligation initial consultation.