CVE-2026-123007
NGINX OSS 1.9.5–1.31.8 with HTTP/2. Direct static file serving was also successfully tested.
CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633 enable unauthenticated code execution on NGINX servers according to researcher findings. Both require HTTP/2. Fixes have been available since 18 November; a public PoC exists for CVE-2026-123007. No real-world attacks are confirmed at the source cutoff.
NGINX accepts HTTPS traffic and routes it to websites, APIs and applications. A flaw in the server itself can therefore affect environments with secure application code. Assessment must still consider reachability, build, configuration and exploit maturity.
A version number alone is insufficient. HTTP/2, proxy usage, package source and the actually running worker matter.
NGINX OSS 1.9.5–1.31.8 with HTTP/2. Direct static file serving was also successfully tested.
NGINX OSS 1.19.7–1.31.8 with HTTP/2 as a reverse proxy; exploitation is linked to low connection-slot availability.
NGINX OSS 1.30.7 stable or 1.31.9 mainline. NGINX Plus 37.0.8.1 or 37.3.0.1 for the current fix baseline.
Inventory container images, appliances and ingress components. Distributions may backport fixes without changing the upstream version number.
The timeline follows statements from Wiz, F5 and the participating research teams.
This remains conceptual and contains no exploit instructions. Actual exploitation requires specific builds, memory conditions and network access.
An attacker must communicate directly with an affected NGINX listener. An HTTP/2 terminator in front may alter the path but does not protect a directly reachable origin.
CVE-2026-123007 uses incorrect send_window accounting; CVE-2026-123633 uses a reusable-marked connection with an active request.
Researchers describe memory disclosure, heap manipulation and ASLR bypass as steps toward the demonstrated code execution.
The attack can run commands with NGINX worker privileges. Root access is not automatic.
A compromised server can expose websites, APIs, data and multiple downstream services. Such follow-on attacks are not confirmed here.
Rapid7 describes the PoC for a freshly started lab environment. The demonstrated approach depends on specific x86-64/glibc conditions, heap layout, ASLR bypass and very large HTTP/2 traffic. This limits reliability, not the urgency of patching.
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Prioritise reachable instances, verifiable fix status and control of old workers. Vendor and distribution guidance remains authoritative.
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As of 19 November 2026, no confirmed real-world exploitation has been reported. Neither CVE is listed in CISA KEV. This does not prove the absence of attacks and does not reduce the urgency of the available fix.
The two attack paths described here require HTTP/2. The security release also contains other fixes for HTTP/3, resolver and mail proxy. Disabling HTTP/2 is therefore only a temporary mitigation for these two CVEs.
No. The demonstrated NGINX code execution runs as the worker process. Xint’s described host escalation uses a separate Linux kernel SCTP vulnerability and must not be conflated with the NGINX RCE.
It depends on implementation. An HTTP/2-terminating service may alter parts of the attack. A directly reachable origin remains exposed. Restrict origin access and patch regardless.
Not always. Distributions may backport security fixes without increasing the upstream version. Compare the full package version with the relevant security advisory.
No. Rapid7 documents the PoC for a fresh lab environment and numerous prerequisites, including heap conditions, ASLR bypass and very large traffic volume. Urgency comes from potential impact, not guaranteed success.
Information is based on researcher reports, official NGINX/F5 information, the Rapid7 PoC and the CISA catalog through 19 November 2026. Laboratory findings and real-world exploitation are distinguished.
This briefing does not replace technical investigation or legal advice. Adapt actions to your environment and current vendor and distribution guidance.
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