Critical RCEs · Patch available · Briefing

NGINX HTTP/2: Two critical RCEsPatch now – assess exposure and PoC correctly

CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633 enable unauthenticated code execution on NGINX servers according to researcher findings. Both require HTTP/2. Fixes have been available since 18 November; a public PoC exists for CVE-2026-123007. No real-world attacks are confirmed at the source cutoff.

  • CVSS 4.0: 9.2 · Critical
  • HTTP/2 required
  • Fixed: 1.30.7 or 1.31.9
  • Public PoC for CVE-2026-123007

At a glance

What is confirmed – and what is not

NGINX accepts HTTPS traffic and routes it to websites, APIs and applications. A flaw in the server itself can therefore affect environments with secure application code. Assessment must still consider reachability, build, configuration and exploit maturity.

  1. Both flaws concern HTTP/2. With HTTP/2 disabled, these two attack paths are unreachable.
  2. CVE-2026-123007 is particularly broad. It dates back to NGINX 1.9.5 and was demonstrated with static files and no backend.
  3. CVE-2026-123633 has additional conditions. The path affects reverse-proxy processing when available connection slots run low.
  4. A public PoC is not evidence of attacks. Rapid7 released code for a fresh lab environment; no real-world attacks are confirmed.
  5. “2Root” does not mean automatic root. NGINX execution runs as the worker. The described host escalation uses a separate Linux SCTP flaw.
  6. Fixes are available. NGINX OSS 1.30.7 and 1.31.9 fix both flaws; current NGINX Plus fix releases are available.

Supported by primary sources

  • Multiple research teams independently confirmed both vulnerabilities.
  • Wiz and Rapid7 demonstrated code execution under laboratory conditions.
  • Rapid7 published a PoC for CVE-2026-123007 with explicit limitations.
  • NGINX officially lists vulnerable and fixed version ranges.

Cannot be inferred

  • No confirmed exploitation in real customer environments at the cutoff
  • No automatic root access from the two NGINX RCEs alone
  • No guarantee that the public PoC works on production or busy servers
  • No blanket CDN or WAF protection, especially for a directly reachable origin
Exposure

Assess versions and configurations together

A version number alone is insufficient. HTTP/2, proxy usage, package source and the actually running worker matter.

CVE-2026-123007

NGINX OSS 1.9.5–1.31.8 with HTTP/2. Direct static file serving was also successfully tested.

CVE-2026-123633

NGINX OSS 1.19.7–1.31.8 with HTTP/2 as a reverse proxy; exploitation is linked to low connection-slot availability.

Fixed releases

NGINX OSS 1.30.7 stable or 1.31.9 mainline. NGINX Plus 37.0.8.1 or 37.3.0.1 for the current fix baseline.

Packages and embedded servers

Inventory container images, appliances and ingress components. Distributions may backport fixes without changing the upstream version number.

Include NGINX Plus, containers and appliances

Check package or image provenance and vendor guidance. For embedded NGINX, the visible upstream version alone may not determine fix status. [2][5]

Timeline

From coordinated disclosure to public PoC

The timeline follows statements from Wiz, F5 and the participating research teams.

  1. Research

    Wiz reports HTTP/2 use-after-free

    The CVE-2026-123633 report includes confirmed code execution with ASLR bypass and a proposed fix. F5 notes an earlier report from another team. [1][5]

  2. Vendor

    Patch supplied for review

    F5 supplies Wiz with a patch for CVE-2026-123633 to review. [1]

  3. Research

    Second HTTP/2 vulnerability reported

    Wiz reports the flow-control issue later tracked as CVE-2026-123007. [1]

  4. Vendor

    Security release and public PoC

    F5 and NGINX publish fixes. Rapid7 releases a PoC for CVE-2026-123007 with documented technical requirements and limitations. [1][2][4]

  5. Research

    No confirmed real-world exploitation

    No confirmed real-world attack reports are available at the cutoff; neither CVE is listed in the CISA KEV catalog. [6][7]

Attack path

How HTTP/2 traffic can lead to worker compromise

This remains conceptual and contains no exploit instructions. Actual exploitation requires specific builds, memory conditions and network access.

  1. Untrusted HTTP/2 access

    An attacker must communicate directly with an affected NGINX listener. An HTTP/2 terminator in front may alter the path but does not protect a directly reachable origin.

  2. Flow-control or lifecycle flaw

    CVE-2026-123007 uses incorrect send_window accounting; CVE-2026-123633 uses a reusable-marked connection with an active request.

  3. Memory access and heap conditions

    Researchers describe memory disclosure, heap manipulation and ASLR bypass as steps toward the demonstrated code execution.

  4. Code execution as worker

    The attack can run commands with NGINX worker privileges. Root access is not automatic.

  5. Shared entry point to applications

    A compromised server can expose websites, APIs, data and multiple downstream services. Such follow-on attacks are not confirmed here.

Why the public PoC does not work everywhere

Rapid7 describes the PoC for a freshly started lab environment. The demonstrated approach depends on specific x86-64/glibc conditions, heap layout, ASLR bypass and very large HTTP/2 traffic. This limits reliability, not the urgency of patching.

Useful monitoring and hunting signals

  • Unusually long-lived HTTP/2 connections with very large data volumes and many WINDOW_UPDATE frames
  • Unexpected NGINX worker crashes or restarts
  • Unexpected processes or commands launched by the NGINX worker
  • Direct origin access that bypasses CDN or WAF paths
Self-check

Are the five key controls confirmed?

Assessment runs only in your browser. Answers are not stored or transmitted. This check does not replace technical investigation.

  1. Are all NGINX instances, container images and appliances inventoried with package and fix status?
  2. Are HTTP/2 listeners and proxy conditions assessed for both CVEs?
  3. Are fixed releases or confirmed distribution backports installed?
  4. Has a new worker verifiably started after updating?
  5. Are worker crashes, unexpected processes and suspicious HTTP/2 connections monitored?
Your assessment

Answered: 0 of 5. The assessment appears after the final answer.

Answers are neither stored nor transmitted.

Action plan

What operators should do now

Prioritise reachable instances, verifiable fix status and control of old workers. Vendor and distribution guidance remains authoritative.

Inventory

Make the attack surface visible

  • Record NGINX instances, images, appliances and ingress components.
  • Check HTTP/2, proxy use and public or origin reachability.
  • Assess upstream and full package versions together.
  • Prioritise internet-facing systems and shared entry points.
Patch

Install and activate the fix

  • Install NGINX OSS 1.30.7 or 1.31.9 or confirmed fixed packages.
  • Use current vendor fix releases for NGINX Plus.
  • Inspect processes after updating and terminate old workers.
  • Test configuration and use a controlled deployment.
Bridge

Temporarily disable HTTP/2

  • If patching is not immediately possible: http2 off; in affected server blocks.
  • For older configurations, remove the http2 parameter from listen directives.
  • Test compatibility, restart NGINX in a controlled way and check old workers.
  • Re-enable HTTP/2 only after the fix is confirmed.
Suspect a compromise?

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FAQ

Frequently asked questions about the NGINX HTTP/2 RCEs

Are the two vulnerabilities already being exploited?

As of 19 November 2026, no confirmed real-world exploitation has been reported. Neither CVE is listed in CISA KEV. This does not prove the absence of attacks and does not reduce the urgency of the available fix.

Is a server without HTTP/2 affected by these two flaws?

The two attack paths described here require HTTP/2. The security release also contains other fixes for HTTP/3, resolver and mail proxy. Disabling HTTP/2 is therefore only a temporary mitigation for these two CVEs.

Does an attacker automatically gain root?

No. The demonstrated NGINX code execution runs as the worker process. Xint’s described host escalation uses a separate Linux kernel SCTP vulnerability and must not be conflated with the NGINX RCE.

Does a CDN or WAF protect the NGINX server?

It depends on implementation. An HTTP/2-terminating service may alter parts of the attack. A directly reachable origin remains exposed. Restrict origin access and patch regardless.

Is the version number sufficient for distribution packages?

Not always. Distributions may backport security fixes without increasing the upstream version. Compare the full package version with the relevant security advisory.

Does the public PoC prove easy exploitation everywhere?

No. Rapid7 documents the PoC for a fresh lab environment and numerous prerequisites, including heap conditions, ASLR bypass and very large traffic volume. Urgency comes from potential impact, not guaranteed success.

Sources

Sources and further information

Information is based on researcher reports, official NGINX/F5 information, the Rapid7 PoC and the CISA catalog through 19 November 2026. Laboratory findings and real-world exploitation are distinguished.

  1. [1]Wiz Research: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in NGINX: CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007,
  2. [2]NGINX: NGINX Security Advisories,
  3. [3]F5: NGINX security advisory – November 2026,
  4. [4]Rapid7 / Stephen Fewer: CVE-2026-123007 – proof-of-concept scripts and limitations,
  5. [5]Xint: NGINX2Root: New Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities in NGINX Require Urgent Patching,
  6. [6]CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog,
  7. [7]Tenable: NGINX2Root (CVE-2026-123007): Frequently asked questions,

This briefing does not replace technical investigation or legal advice. Adapt actions to your environment and current vendor and distribution guidance.

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